

“Somos Melillense!”

Borders and boundaries in a Spanish city in Morocco

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Master's thesis
Department of Social Anthropology

University of Oslo

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Abstract

This dissertation is based on a 5,5 month fieldwork in Melilla, a Spanish city in northeastern Morocco. The city is about 13 km², and had a population of 85,497 in 2014. Melilla was conquered in the extension of “la reconquista”, where the Spanish Monarchs defeated the last stronghold of Al-Andalus, the Kingdom of Granada. Initially, the city was conquered to defend the Iberian Peninsula against a new invasion from North Africa, and until the late 19th century, the city was mainly a military fortress. The city was rapidly populated from the early 20th century. From 1912-1956, the city was part of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco, and during this time, a new conflict broke out between the Spanish and the surrounding Rifian tribes.

The politics of Melilla has long been one of exclusion, as the Muslim inhabitants were not granted Spanish citizenship until the mid-80s. Today, the city has become famous as a migration hub, and a six meter high fence surrounds the whole city.

In this thesis I will explore some theoretical concept with the empirical material I collected in Melilla. I have made a separation between borders and boundaries. Borders will be defined as the outer edges of the territorial unit called the nation-state, whilst boundaries are defined as surrounding ethnic and social groups. This separation is however done to see how they cooperate and are intertwined. A boundary is the point where two things become different, and all borders are consequently boundaries, but not vice versa. The point where two things becomes different has proven to be difficult to pinpoint, and this thesis is an attempt to trace the negotiations that happen in the border – boundary nexus.

Today, Melilla is facing a demographic shift, where the Spanish Muslim will convert from being a minority into becoming the majority population in Melilla. In this thesis, I will explore the relationship between international mobility, Spanish nationalism in the margins of the nation-state, and the way ethnic reconfigurations are handled in the face of a demographic shift. The mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion on the Spanish – Moroccan frontier are influenced by a mixture of historical periods and events, and recent identity politics.


Keywords: Melilla, Spain, Morocco, Borders, Boundaries, Migration, Nationalism, Franco, Identity, History

Acknowledgments

Through this thesis I am exploring how borders and boundaries exists in relation between two or more entities, and how such entities rarely exists in a vacuum. During the long hours spent writing this thesis it has at times seemed as if I was doing this undertaking all by myself, but the result would have been very different without all the help and guidance I have gotten during the process. I have to thank all the people I met in Melilla and Nador, without whom I could not have written this thesis.

I am very thankful for all the help and guidance I have received from my supervisor Thomas Hylland Eriksen, and for letting me be part of the *Overheating* project. The feedback I have gotten from the other members of the project has also been hugely helpful. I wish to thank Daniel Koski-Karell, who conducted fieldwork in Melilla before me, and who has given me advice before, under and after my fieldwork in Melilla. Also, I am thankful to Tony Sandset for both theoretical input and not so theoretical input.

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Trevor Nickolls: Warmun Mandala (c) Trevor Nickolls/BONO

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Chapter 1. Reflections on fieldwork in Spanish – Morocco

Melilla is both the Orient and the Occident, as all Mediterranean cities, heritage of numerous civilizations; it feeds daily on the cultural fruits of Africa, Europe, Asia and America... Everything has been abundantly mixed, blended.

(Nasser, 2014, p. 26. Originally in Spanish, translation by author)

The first time I heard about Melilla was in an apartment in Mumbai in early 2014. I was doing an internship for an Indian NGO, and had recently returned from a short fieldwork in the rural region of Maharashtra. A girl from Morocco had recently arrived and been given the room I had stayed, leaving me out in the living room where I crashed on a couch. In addition to me and the Moroccan girl, the apartment was home to a woman from the Netherlands, and one Mexican man and one Nigerian man, whom all had left their countries to work in Mumbai. One afternoon, while teaching me how to make Moroccan tea, she started talking about two Spanish enclaved cities within Morocco. I was mesmerized. In Morocco, many people are angry about Spain's occupation of parts of their country, she told me. In early April 2014 I returned to Oslo. The deadline for handing in a project proposal for the master's degree application was getting close, and I had to figure out what I had to do. Originally, I intended to go to India for my fieldwork, but having just returned from there, I was tempted to go somewhere new. After some research on the Spanish cities in Morocco, Melilla seemed more appealing than Ceuta. I made a draft of my project proposal and consulted Thomas Hylland Eriksen to see if the project might be relevant to his ongoing *Overheating*-project, as it was accepting master's students. He told me it was, so I handed in the proposal and crossed my fingers.

The fact that I first heard about Melilla in India by a Moroccan illustrates an important fact of life in the 21st century; people are increasingly mobile, and distance as a natural boundary has a decreasing function for maintaining difference. Technological advances have enabled rickshaw drivers in Mumbai to play “Barbie girl” by the Norwegian pop group Aqua, and taxi drivers in Norway are able to play hits from the newest Bollywood movies. In other words, technologies allow us to both connect to foreign cultures, and maintain bonds to the ones “left behind”. One hundred years have passed since Bronislaw

Malinowski started writing his later to be famous diary¹ from Papua New Guinea, and although the sentiments and frustrations expressed by Malinowski are still felt by fieldworkers, the field itself has changed. It is no longer possible to state that “the native is not the natural companion for a white man” (Malinowski, 1961 [1922], p. 7), as they (the “natives”, informants, etc.) are becoming like “us”, and gradually, we (anthropologists, Occidentals, etc.) are becoming like “them”. During my fieldwork, everyone had seen the same movies, and everyone listened to the American rapper Flo Rida. Globalized popular culture make people across the globe share references, and we are increasingly aware of how lives are lived on the throughout the world. Increased circulation of people, culture and goods does however not seem to lead to the implosion of geopolitical borders, social boundaries, and perceived differences, and it has been argued that modern societies are both more diversified and more homogenous than ever (Eriksen, 2010a, p.198).

In this thesis, I will analyze the maintenance of social boundaries and geopolitical borders, and see in which way they are intertwined, and how this is dependent on circumstances. The world is increasingly intertwined, but as I will show, there is a discrepancy in what is allowed to flow through borders. Popular culture and cuisine (perhaps best described as cultural artifacts) are not subject to visa requirements, and are crossing borders faster than ever as Internet bandwidth increases. Nevertheless, focus on national identity and difference prevails, and in this thesis, I will explore some of the ways in which difference is articulated.

This dissertation is the result of almost six months long fieldwork in early 2015, lasting from mid-January until the end of June. Melilla is a small coastal city located in north eastern Morocco, and covers an area of about 12 km², enclosed by a fence separating the city from Morocco on land and the Alboran Sea as a natural barrier. In the last available census, from 2014, Melilla had a population of 85,497 inhabitants, and was one of only three regions in Spain that experienced population growth (El Faro, 2015).

1 Malinowski, B. (1989[1967]) *A diary in the strictest sense of the term*. The Athlone Press. London

Research questions and method

In this dissertation I will see how Melilla is experienced by different groups who either stay in or are going through the city. For some, the city is an integral part of Spain, whilst others perceive it as a buffer city on the way to the “real” Spain and Europe.

In addition to specifically analyzing how Melilla is constructed and perceived by different groups, I will analyze the concepts of borders and boundaries through empirical cases from Melilla. To do so, I have made a set of research questions.

- What is the relationship between geopolitical borders and social boundaries?
- How does the border/boundary manifest itself differently depending on which side it is seen from?
- What is allowed to permeate the border/boundary, and what is the logic behind what is allowed to flow through and what is not?
- How is the grammar for inclusion and exclusion articulated and performed?

These four questions are all related to borders and boundaries, and are general questions that might have been answered in any border city, but I will continuously put them in local context. The limit where two things becomes different requires the existence of two things, but the way the border/boundary is manifested, and the possibility to permeate it, often differs depending on which side of the border/boundary one is. In the context of international mobility, it is generally easier to exit than to enter a sovereign territory, as entering a foreign state usually requires some sort of visa. In chapter 3, I will see more explicitly how the border that separates Melilla, and thus Spain, from Morocco is crossed by different groups. The nexus between social boundaries and geopolitical borders will mainly be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, where I will first analyze how Spaniards create a connection to the mainland by “performing Spain”, before I see how Spanish Muslims in Melilla belong to several social boundaries (manifested through culture, religion, ethnicity and language).

My main method in Melilla was to be out and participate as much as possible. Doing fieldwork in an urban environment in 2015 proved to be different from many of the monographs and articles that formed my anthropological mindset. My fieldwork would for

example be very different without the use of a range of social media and messaging applications. Through social media I was made aware of events and lectures, where I met people who became informants. I see such utilities as efficient tools for fieldworkers. Various mobile phone applications, ranging from cameras to audio recorders and text apps synchronizing with my computer helped me. Automatically synchronizing from apps such as “Dropbox” for pictures and “Evernote” for text, proved to be efficient and saved me much time. Instead of spending time to interpret my jottings, I could focus on my data and questions, and do research to constantly be better prepared for the next day. When I first heard about the troubled relationship between Arabs and Rifians, I spent a day researching the issue rather than interpreting my own handwriting.

Before departure, I tried to learn as much Spanish as possible, and felt like I had reached a decent level. Upon arrival, I was however proven wrong. In general, southern Spanish sounds very different than northern accents and more text-book like Spanish. In addition to not pronouncing certain letters, like “s”, the rapid speech left me confused. It came as a relief when one of my Spanish mainland friends at the end of my fieldwork told me that even he sometimes struggled to understand what people in Melilla were saying. To improve my Spanish, I spent time at the local university practicing verbs and reading Spanish. I found a social media site for people wishing to learn English in Melilla, and as my English was better than that of many in Melilla, this became a comparative advantage for me. Through this site I organized meetings in order to both practice and ask language related questions. In my project proposal I suggested that I would find some Spanish students to live with, in order to improve my Spanish. I did find a Spanish girl whom I lived with during my fieldwork, but as she was an English teacher who had spent parts of her childhood years in the UK, the arrangement did not much improve my language. In April, I had reached a level that allowed me to conduct more formal interviews in Spanish with patient informants. Most of the data presented in this thesis comes from informal conversations, supplemented with a few more structured interviews.

I was always upfront about what I was doing in the field. Melilla is a small city, and does not attract too many tourists, except for the occasional cruise ship stopping by, or backpackers on their way to Morocco. Consequently, people were curious about what I was doing there, and being open about what I was doing served as a good conversation starter.

The field – the establishment of Melilla

Like other Mediterranean cities, Melilla has never been isolated from its surroundings. The city was first established under the name Rusadir by the Phoenicians, and was later ruled by Vandals and Romans before being conquered during Arab expansion into the Maghreb in the 7th century (Sánchez, 2004, p. 40). In 1492, the last stronghold of Al-Andalus, the Kingdom of Granada, was defeated by the “Catholic Monarchs”, Isabel I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon. Al-Andalus is the name of the historical period when parts of the Iberian Peninsula were controlled by Muslim rulers, mostly from the area that is now Morocco. The conquest of Melilla in 1497 was done in the extension of the “reconquista²” of Spain, and was, in the words of a local historian, not done out of an eagerness for conquest, but to preserve the hegemony of the Spanish throne (implicitly meaning the Iberian Peninsula) (Sánchez, 2004, p. 44). For a long time the city remained a military outpost where people from all over Spain served in the army (Sánchez, 2004, p. 47). Over the years, Melilla suffered from various attacks, mostly from the surrounding Rifian population, but maintained its position as a military fortress, which today is known as Melilla la Vieja, or Old Melilla. In the 1700s, two notable agreements were made with the monarchs of Morocco, recognizing Melilla and Ceuta as Spanish territories (Sánchez, 2004, p. 66-67). In 1862, Melilla's new external limits were marked by cannonballs shot from the fortress, and ratified through an agreement signed in Tangier the same year (Sánchez, 2004, p. 73).

For a long time, the city remained a military outpost, before it experienced rapid population growth in the late 1800s and early 1900s.

2 The reconquista, or reconquest, is a term used to describe the “reconquest” of the Iberian Peninsula, and more generally, to describe Christian resistance to Muslim rule. Whether it was really a reconquest or a conquest is debatable, as Al-Andalus lasted from 711-1492. What was (re-)conquered looked different than what had been “lost”.




Illustration 1: Population growth in Melilla. Graph by author.

The settling of Melilla came as a response to many smaller conflicts with the surrounding population, and after a confrontation in 1893 it was decided that a new neighborhood was to be built outside the walls of the fortress (Sánchez, 2004, p. 193). In the early 1900s, schools, sporting clubs and a theater were built to entertain the growing population, and the river which had previously flown through what is now a park in the city center was redirected to make space for the planned infrastructure of Melilla (Sánchez, 2004, pp. 200-202). The river, Rio de Oro, never conformed to its new course, and causes parts of the city center to flood multiple times every year. During the early 1900s, Spanish companies started mining operations in the surrounding region, and attracted new migrants from the peninsula (Driessen, 1992, p. 43). By the 1930s, the rapid settling of Melilla had started to cause social tensions, and the city suffered from widespread poverty as the new settlers, mostly of whom came from the Iberian Peninsula, could not find work (Driessen, 1992, p. 45). In addition to Spanish settlers, Jewish and Rifian migrants moved to the city, and in 1917, there was a total of 37,016 residents in the city, out of which, 33,625 were Spanish, 2903 Jews, and 234 Muslim (Driessen, 1992, p. 44).

From 1912 to 1956, Melilla was part of the Spanish protectorate, which covered the large parts of North Morocco, and Western Sahara³. During the time of the protectorate, Melilla served as the base for Spanish expansion into the Moroccan hinterlands, something which

³ Western Sahara was later “reconquered” by Morocco in 1975, in an event known as “the green march”. According to Morocco, the territory is and has always been part of their sovereign territory.

caused a war between the Spaniards and neighboring Rifian tribes, who united in opposition to the new common enemy. The Rif War lasted from 1921-1926, during which Spain suffered massive losses at the hands of the Rifian resistance, under the leadership of a former resident of Melilla, Abd el-Krim. Today, Abd el-Krim is remembered as a hero in Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012), while most Spaniards have never heard of him. The soon-to-be dictator Francisco Franco was one of the military commanders on the Spanish side, and his involvement in the Rif War, as a defender of Melilla, is honored to this day with a statue at the port of Melilla (Pinos, 2009, p. 73).

Upon Moroccan independence in 1956, Spain gave up the majority of their protectorate, with the exception of Melilla, Ceuta, Western Sahara, and some smaller islands off the Moroccan coast. By the time, Melilla and Ceuta had become populated cities, and this was used to legitimize continued Spanish governance over the cities. It must not be forgotten, a local historian has argued, that Melilla was Spanish 18 years before the integration of Navarra to the Spanish crown, and 279 years before the existence of the United States (Sánchez, 2004, p. 50). Moroccan scholar Said Saddiki has however argued that “Morocco is one of the existing oldest (sic) monarchies in the world, and it had ruled without dispute its coasts and ports located at Western North Africa, including Ceuta and Melilla” (2010, p. 7). As he further argues, “Ceuta and Melilla has never been *terra nullis* (“no man's land”)” (Saddiki, 2010, p. 7). History is always seen in the eye of the beholder.

Today Melilla is famous for its architecture, much of it being the legacy of the architect Enrique Nieto y Nieto whose statue is located in the end of the main shopping road, Avenida Juan Carlos I. The avenue consists of a variety of stores and banks, while the side streets are filled with cafes and tapas bars. On one side of the street, next to the building “Edificio La Reconquista”, lies a church designed by Nieto y Nieto, and further up the same road lies the city synagogue, designed by the same man. On the opposite side of Avenida Juan Carlos I is Parque Hernandez is a large public park with tiled fountains and tall palm trees on each side of a walkway with tiles that are laid down in the shape of waves. Outside the hours of the siesta, the park is bustling with life, and an arena for concerts and events. The park is fenced in, and closes down on windy days as leaves and branches from the tall palm trees might to fall down. Another place where the inhabitants of Melilla meet is the “Plaza de las Cuatro Culturas”, a celebration of the four cultures that Melilla is famous for.

These cultures are the Christians, the Muslims, the Jews and the Hindus. In tourist's guides, these four cultures are presented as living together in a model multicultural society, and Melilla advertises that it is a city of "convivencia"⁴. Today, there is a considerable Chinese population, but these have yet to be incorporated into discourse of Melilla as multicultural city, although they do seem to outnumber the Hindus. Their presence is seen through stores selling cheap goods, and a couple of Chinese restaurants, serving a special kind of Spanish-Chinese cuisine, to my palate, most noticeable by the way eggs and ham were included in the rice served with the dishes.

Melilla is host to the highest number of "modernisme" buildings in Africa, and second only to Barcelona in Spain. Close to the city center is the theater Kursaal, which hosts concerts and plays, many of them free of charge, and the university UNED, where I attended several seminars and concerts. Next to the Teatro Kursaal is a large amphitheater, Auditorium Carvajal. The University of Granada has a campus in Melilla, not far from the golf course that is situated right next to the fence. In the extension of Avenida Juan Carlos lies an area known as El Rastro, and crossing from the former into the latter gives a feeling somewhat similar as that one gets when leaving Spain and entering Morocco. El Rastro starts roughly where the central market, Mercado Central, is located. The area is mainly used by the Spanish Muslim population of Melilla, in addition to Moroccans who come over the border to sell fruit and vegetables on the street. A mosque, also designed by Enrique Nieto y Nieto, is situated in the area, and on warm Fridays, extra carpets are provided outside the mosque to increase its capacity. The mosque is surrounded by cafes selling Moroccan mint tea, with a high number of outdoor tables and chairs provided for their customers. Walking up the hill from El Rastro one enters a part of the town which is mainly inhabited by the Muslim population, where I was warned against going by many of my Spanish informants. A peculiarity in this part of town was how a regular Spanish daily store did not sell alcohol, something that would be unheard of in other parts of the city.

Recent history and politics

Moroccans (and/as Muslims) were not allowed to live in Ceuta and Melilla until 1868 (Enríquez, p. 220). From 1868 and onwards to the 1980s Muslims were allowed to live in the cities, but were only granted a statistical card, a document given on a family and not

4 Roughly meaning a place of where people co-habit peacefully

individual basis, that did not include civil rights in the same way citizenship does. In 1985, the Spanish Law on Aliens was approved. The law provided an opportunity for people from countries with historical and cultural relations with Spain to apply for citizenship, but excluded Morocco (Enríquez, 2007, p. 220). Being included as aliens, and not as citizens whom had rightfully lived in the two cities for multiple years, led to demonstrations in late 1985 and 1986, and culminated in 1987 when four people were wounded by gun shots in a confrontation, out of which one, a Muslim, died (Enríquez, p. 221). The majority of the people of Moroccan origin in Melilla and Ceuta obtained citizenship in 1987. At the time, people of Moroccan origin consisted of some 12.000 (18% of total population) people in Ceuta, and 17.000 (32% of total population) in Melilla (Enríquez, p. 221). Henk Driessen tells a story about a man called Ismael who lived in Melilla as a semi-citizen in the early 1980s. His mother had brought him and his siblings to Melilla when he was young, where they endured the hardships of living without documents until the 1940s, when they were registered in the municipal census, and semi-incorporated as temporary citizens (Driessen, 1992, pp. 153-154). For a long time, he worked as a petty laborer. (Driessen, 1992, p. 154). In the 1960s, he wanted to travel to Western Europe as a migrant worker, something made possible through recent labor recruitment agreements between Morocco and European countries (Driessen, 1992, p. 154; Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 112), but was unable to do so. This was due to difficulties in obtaining a passport. His birth had never been registered in Nador, and his status in Melilla was that of a temporary resident. At the time of Driessen's study, in 1984, he had yet to obtain full citizenship (Driessen, 1992, p. 155). Many Spanish Muslims in Melilla have had similar experiences, spending years as betwixt and between Morocco and Spain, something I will return to in chapter 5.

In 1986, Spain joined the European Community (EC) (now the European Union, or EU) (Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 112). Previous to this, Melilla's outer edges had only been marked by small fences, and some of my informants recalled that they sometimes would realize that they were in Morocco when playing as kids. After joining the EU, Melilla became a “gateway to Europe”, and the 1990s, the city experienced increased migration, where mainly Sub-Saharan Africans started to come in (Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 112). This led to a policy of strengthening the city's outer borders, and a fence was completed around the city in 1998. The fence was further strengthened in 2005 with EU funds.

Informants, challenges and ethics

As a soon-to-be social anthropologist, and a fieldworker, I have accepted the huge and difficult task of re-presenting the voices and opinions of the people who were kind enough to lend me their time and thoughts during my fieldwork. The process of writing down data and writing up a refined text is a process of translation, although the finished material might be presented as a pure and objective work. In anthropology we have the honor of working with live human beings, rather than on the basis of for example statistics and other variables. This comes with a great responsibility, as those we study are live human beings who will continue to live their lives when the writing is done.

Nancy Scheper-Hughes writes that “anthropologists are a restless nomadic tribe, hunters and gatherers of human values” (2000, p. 133). As hunters and gatherers, anthropologists are dependent upon they environment in which their study is located, and Scheper-Hughes further notes that “we [the anthropologists] are at the mercy of those who agree to take us in as much as they are at our mercy in the ways we represent them after the living-in and living-with is over” (2000, p. 133). Scheper-Hughes' account of her return to the field where she wrote the somewhat controversial *Saints, Scholars and Schizophrenics* (1977) is insightful, as the book was widely publicized and seemingly affected the image of the town in which she did her fieldwork. Upon her return, she was no longer welcome, and was blamed for only having presented the negative sides of the small community that welcomed her ten years earlier. An old informant blames her and says: “You wrote a book to please yourself at our expense. *You ran us down, girl, you ran us down.*” (2000, p. 119). Another informant shames her for only writing about the negative things, and never about their strengths, the beauty of the village and grace of their step dancers (2000, p. 119). The general sentiment was that she had treated those who had accepted her into their society unfairly, and consequently, she was now unwelcome. Anthropological fieldwork requires that we stay with people for a long time and get to know them. By doing so, one is more or less accepted into the social group, and a bond of trust is established. I suspect that anthropologists, and others in the social sciences, have acquired a critical eye, and as such, have a tendency to focus on what seems somewhat out of the ordinary. The betwixt and between, and the matter out of place. This anthropological gaze can be problematic, and the example of Scheper-Hughes return to Ireland is a shining example. However, the

betwixt and out of the ordinary does often need to be addressed, and consequently, the challenge is to find a balance.

It is difficult to construct categories of a certain *the* doing *that* and convince the reader that what is written is the one truth. Or at least, any attempt in doing so is obviously fragile and does most likely obscure something. James Clifford suggested that one rather than presenting a “truth” in when writing ethnography, it would be better to acknowledge the fact that our presentations are constructs of a dynamic between the informant and the anthropologist. In his words, “ethnographic truths are inherently *partial* – committed and incomplete” (1986, p. 7). I will not repeat the arguments of the book here, but it is necessary to address the problem of representation and the dialectic between the anthropologist and informants. Post-colonial theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak further addresses the problem of representation, and differs between two kinds. Representation, she sees as a kind of speaking for, as is done in politics, and different from “re-presentation”, which more resembles portrayals in art and philosophy. (Spivak, 1988, p. 275). Re-presentation includes the translation done between the informant and the author, and writing about people hence follow a similar process of translation as the that done by an artist painting a picture. Like in a picture, it is the author, or painter, who decides who and what is to be included and what will be left out. The problem of representation as addressed by Clifford and Spivak does not lead any conclusive answer, as it is a difficult question, but I find it important to recognize that my informants are re-presented in this thesis, and that the way they appear is influenced by myself.

The informants in this thesis come from different backgrounds, both ethnically and social-economically, and together they make the mosaic that this dissertation is based on. Writing about boundaries and borders, and how they are perceived from different sides, makes it necessary to include people on both sides. The informants in this thesis can largely be divided into four groups, although some of these overlap. These groups are the Spaniards, Spanish Muslims, Rifians and Moroccan Arabs. The following illustration is meant as a guide, and is not absolute or strictly categorical. The way the groups are presented in the illustration is not meant to be seen as a hierarchy. It rather identifies some important features of the ethnic outlines in Melilla, and the categories are based on how informants define themselves and others. I have not included the Hindu, Jewish, and Chinese

populations of Melilla, as these are not discussed in the dissertation.

Spanish		Moroccans	
Spaniards		Berber/Amazigh	Moroccan Arabs
Peninsular	Melillan born	Rifians	

Illustration 2: Ethnic outlines in Melilla. Illustration by author

Spaniards are divided in two groups; those brought up in Melilla (Melillan born), and those who have come to work or study from the peninsula (Peninsular). Henk Driessen, who did fieldwork in Melilla in the 1980s, described how many of the Spanish residents in Melilla lived “with their backs against Morocco” and that this was especially true for those with parents and grandparents from Melilla, whom considered themselves as “true *Melillense*” (Driessen, 1992, p. 15). In other studies from Melilla, those I have chosen to call Spaniards have been categorized as “cristianos” or catholic Spaniards, but as many of my informants were secular, although raised as catholic, I have chosen the term Spaniard. My rough definition of a Spaniard includes both holding a Spanish citizenship and being part of a supposed homogenized Spanish culture (ethnicity is important, but under-communicated). Language as a marker of identity is important amongst the Spaniards, and native born Melillans have a distinctive Spanish dialect⁵ that even some peninsular Spaniards struggle to understand.

The Moroccans in this dissertation are roughly divided in two, the Amazigh⁶ (Berbers) and the Arabs. Moroccan Arabs are the majority and the dominant population in Morocco. They are defined as the dominant population because they hold the political power in Morocco. King Mohammed VI is of Arab descent, and his father Hassan II had a notoriously bad relationship to the Rifian population of Morocco. Although most Moroccans speak Arabic, Arab Moroccans and Amazigh Moroccans, included Rifians, have linguistic differences, as the latter also speak various forms of Tamazight, or Berber-language, in addition to Arabic.

⁵ Some informants said that the dialect in Melilla contains loanwords from Tamazight.

⁶ In general, one might write Amazigh as Imazighen in plural, but as this was not done by any of my informants, I will only use Amazigh, both in plural and single.

Tamazight speakers in Morocco have previously been discriminated against, but after recent reforms, Tamazight is now recognized as an official language in Morocco together with Arabic. The Amazigh, or Berbers, are the second largest ethnic group in Morocco. Amazigh is a generic term for the indigenous North African population. Indigenous is here meant as the descendants of the people whom lived in North Africa prior to the Arab conquests, and the Amazigh includes groups such as the Kabyle in Algeria, Tuaregs in Mali, and Bedouin populations in Egypt, in addition to the Rifians who inhabit the Rif⁷ area of Morocco.

The term Melillense generally means residents of Melilla. Previously it was predominantly used by Spaniards, but is increasingly being used by the Spanish Muslims of Melilla. The majority of Spanish Muslims in Melilla are in a hybrid position between two of my informant groups, the Spaniards and the Rifians. I have not categorized Spanish Muslims in the illustration, as they are associated with more than one category by my informants. Spanish Muslims belong to social and symbolic boundaries (groups) on each side of the border. Religion is the most obvious factor that relates them to the Moroccan side of the border, and the terms Muslim and Moroccan seemed to be used indifferently amongst many of both my Moroccan and Spaniard informants to categorize the Spanish Muslims. Language is another factor that partly connects Spanish Muslims to the Moroccan side. Some of the younger Spanish Muslims I spoke to in Melilla used various Rifian words while speaking in Spanish, sometimes unintentionally.

In Melilla, I achieved a kind of status as a semi-included outsider within the various groups I spent time with. Rather than spending my time with one group, I chose to go between different groups and try to understand both how they (re-)presented them self, and how they saw others. My informants were aware of this fact, and I tried to work as an intermediary between various informants whom to my knowledge never met. In this way, I could extend the discussions I had with for example Spanish and Moroccan Rifians, to Moroccan Arabs or Spaniards. I suspect that my access to the various groups was a consequence of both who I was, but also who I was not. No one disliked me for being Spanish, Arab or Rifian, which both made me an outsider to all groups, but also allowed me to venture between the different groups.

7 Rif (ريف) means “countryside” in Arabic

I have anonymized my informants by changing their names, categorizing them into age-groups and blurred out their home cities, with the exception of those from Melilla.

Previous literature

As with any academic project, this dissertation would look very different without previous literature. Not only is previous literature data which helps me write my thesis, but it also helped me see things that I would not have seen if I had not read these. In this dissertation, I have chosen to focus on Melilla as a city situated in a larger context, as it is situated between both two cultural regions, European Christian and Arab Muslim, and two countries, Morocco and Spain. This influences my choice of literature. In addition to anthropology books and articles, I rely on historical accounts, reports, newspapers and other relevant sources I have come across.

Sociologist Daniel Koski-Karell has been influential to me, not only because of his work (2014), but because of our continuous contact before, during and after my fieldwork. The possibility to discuss my findings as they appeared has been very stimulating. Henk Driessen's book *On the Spanish-Moroccan frontier* (1992) is interesting as we discuss many of the same topics, although situated in different periods of time. Driessen did his fieldwork in Melilla in the 1980s, but when I started reading his book again after my fieldwork it seemed as if I had done a partial restudy of his fieldwork. The book serves as a valuable source of historical reference to much of my work. He finished his fieldwork in 1984, before large portions of the Muslim population got the right to apply for citizenship, and this offers good data for comparison. A collection of articles by local journalist Consantino Domínguez Sánchez (2004) has given insight to how Melilla has been constructed by Melillans over the centuries. David M. McMurray's ethnographic account from Nador (2001) discusses aspects of border crossings and smuggling which I re-encountered during my time in Melilla. Nador is the administrative center of the Nador province, in which Melilla is situated, and is located 10-15 minutes from Beni Ansar by car. Daniela Flesler's account in *Return of the Moor* (2008) has been influential to my perspective of how the historical ties between Morocco and Spain are reinterpreted today. In the book, she traces the reshaping of Moroccans in Spain today, and shows that old ties are broken in order to configure current Moroccan immigration to Spain as a new phenomenon. With the return of the "moor", Flesler argues that Spain is faced with an old ghost, and the "Moors, as the retellings of

Spanish narratives of national identity demonstrate, are precisely that chimera of an ancient enemy against which Spain has formed itself as a nation” (Flesler, 2008, p. 195). Her perspective is interesting in the case of Melilla, as the “Moors” that Spanish identity has been formed as an opposition to are becoming the majority population of the city, not as the constructed “moor”, but as Spanish citizens.

To analyze the people that borders and boundaries are created to separate, I have made an adaption of Giorgio Agamben's categorical pair of *zoe* and *bios* (1998). Agamben's categorical pair is interesting through how *zoe*, which here for the sake of the argument might be translated into the dominated and excluded group although this is somewhat imprecise, is always included through its exclusion. I will discuss this further in chapter two.

Dissertation outline

In this chapter I have presented my research questions, and given an introduction to Melilla and my informant groups. The concise historical introduction to Melilla is necessary for the reader as a backdrop for the chapters to come, and more historical details will be supplemented throughout the thesis as a supplement to the ethnographic findings.

In chapter 2 I will present my theoretical scaffolding. The chapter is my toolbox for understanding my ethnographic material, and includes tools for the different tasks I will encounter. The chapter is concerned with three main theoretical topics: borders, boundaries and bodies. Conceptually separating between borders and boundaries is also a conceptual separation of the state and the nation, and in this dissertation, these separations are done in order to understand how the concepts are connected. The border is seen as the point where one nation-state ends and another begins, and is consequently the margins of the state. The mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion at the border are regulated by the state, which is able to distribute the right to stay within its territory, either permanently through citizenship or temporarily through visas and rights for temporary residency.

Boundaries, I will argue, follow different mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and I will connect boundaries to nationalism. I follow Gellner and Barth's definition of belonging to a nation or in the latter case, an ethnic group, through the way two people belong to the same group, when they recognize each other as belonging to the same group (Gellner, 1990

[1983], p. 7; Barth, 1982 [1969], p. 11). It will however become apparent that mutual recognition is not always something which can be taken for granted, and I hope to show how the definition might be problematic. Lastly in the second chapter, I see how bodies work as the repositories for membership to states and social groups. Bodies can be a repository for membership and identity at the border in two ways; through the body itself, and/or through documentation.

Chapter 3 revolves around borders, and starts with an introduction of the border in Melilla. Here I will discuss Morocco's ambivalent position towards Melilla, as it does not recognize Spanish territory on Moroccan soil, while it at the same time protects the city against migrants from third countries. Then, I will present the way three different informant groups cross the border. First, I follow a group of Spaniard hikers into the Moroccan mountains, before seeing how Moroccans with day visas enter and use the possibilities a Spanish city in Morocco offers. Through these two examples, I will see in which way the border is experienced differently depending on which side one enters or exists from. At the end of chapter 3 I will follow a group of young Moroccan migrants who spend their time in Melilla with the hopes of going to mainland Spain.

Chapter 4 begins by discussing some aspects of living at the border, before drawing attention to some developments of Spanish nationalism post-Francisco Franco. I will argue that Melillans, although being accused of being conservative, mostly rely upon various forms of informal nationalism in their performance of national identity. Furthermore, I will elaborate on Driessen's argument of how "many permanent citizens of Melilla live with their backs against Morocco" (Driessen, 1992, p. 15). Today, facing Spain rather than Morocco is easier than ever, partly through new technologies such as satellite TV and the internet. Together with avoiding certain areas of the city that are mainly populated by Spanish Muslims and Moroccans, it is possible for Spaniards in Melilla to shape their perceptions of being closer to the peninsula rather than Morocco. Lastly, I will discuss how the continued presence of a statue of Francisco Franco, and its reinterpretation, has several implications.

In the last chapter I will discuss the multiple identities imposed on the Spanish Muslim population in Melilla. These constructions are related to Melilla's location, and I will see how Spanish Muslims are included, and include themselves, into several categories. From a

Moroccan point of view, they are often seen as Moroccans, and for a long time this was also the case from a Spanish point of view. Spanish Muslims see themselves as Spanish Muslims, or Melillense, something which will be addressed with data gathered from Spanish Muslims, and in the context of the local election in Melilla in 2015. Lastly, I will analyze the paradoxes of a recent development, in which Spanish Muslims are identified as Amazigh, by both themselves and by Spaniards. The Amazigh, I will show, is like the term Berber a generic term, but it holds different connotations.

Chapter 2. Theoretical scaffolding

The border can be understood as a dangerous place. Things that cross the border undermine the border's authority and have the capacity to “pollute” the inside that the border is trying to protect.

(Haddad, 2007, p. 119)

It is said that the last thing a fish will notice is the water in which it swims. I see theory as a way to de- and reconstruct the situations that I observed during my fieldwork, and hence recognize the water in which I swam. This chapter is mainly theoretical, and introduces concepts that will be applied throughout the thesis. The choice of theory is rooted in my ethnographic material. The concepts and theories in this chapter come from fields ranging from anthropology and sociology, to geography and philosophy. The goal is to produce a toolkit that makes it possible to analyze the empirical data from both a micro and a macro perspective.

The three main topics of this chapter are borders, boundaries and bodies. Borders and boundaries are mechanisms for exclusion and inclusion, while bodies are the objects that are included or excluded in this thesis.

As terms, borders and boundaries are often used indifferently. I will follow Didier Fassin's separation of the two terms, and see the border as a territorial geopolitical limit, such as that of a nation-state, and boundaries as social constructions of symbolical differences (Fassin, 2011, p. 214). Fassin's separation between the two terms is important in the way he tries to simultaneously fuse them, rather than keep them apart, as he argues there has been a tendency to do in anthropological studies (Fassin, 2011, p. 215). A border or boundary surrounding a group or cultural universe can be compared to a semi-permeable membrane, such as that surrounding a cell. Eriksen suggests that what is allowed to go through the membrane depends on a preset grammar, and should something flow through which is not meant to flow through, the cell might renounce it (2010b, p. 201). These mechanisms of inclusion and exclusions are based on the chemical process osmosis (Eriksen, 2010b, p. 201). Being a semi-permeable membrane, the inside of the cell wall follows a different logic than the outside, and exclusion/expulsion follows different criteria than inclusion (Eriksen, 2010b, p. 202). Separating borders and boundaries makes it

possible to identify who sets the grammar for inclusion and exclusion.

In this chapter I will first present borders and boundaries as separate concepts. Here, I will focus on the institutional features of the border and the boundary, and how they operate. Borders are, in this distinction, operated by the state, who decides what and who is allowed and not allowed to flow through. In the discussion of boundaries, I will first present some earlier theories of how boundaries operate, and in which way boundaries can be based on various features, such as language and religion. After this, I will see how nationalism is related to social and ethnic boundaries, and borders.

In the end of this chapter, I present persons as bodies, and in what way their bodily identity is constructed in the face of borders and boundaries.

Borders

Territoriality is a form of behavior that uses a bounded space, a territory, as the instrument for securing a particular outcome. By controlling access to a territory through boundary restrictions, the content of a territory can be manipulated and its character designed.

(Taylor, 1994, p. 151)

In an interview with the American talk show host Stephen Colbert, the controversial presidential candidate Donald Trump summarized the relationship between the border and the nation-state. “Look, we have a country, we have borders. We have no border right now, we don't have a country” (Trump, 2015). Following up on this he suggests to build a wall against Mexico to prevent further immigration from the country's southern border, in order to, as his argument goes “make America great again”. I will not dwell further on the politics of Trump, but his statement serves as a good starting point for a discussion on borders.

Trump's suggestion to build a wall against Mexico to curb illegal migration has been duly criticized, also from European countries. The paradox is that Trump's dream has been a reality in Europe for a long time⁸. Recently, in the face of non-western migration, Europe has experienced a renewed focus on internal borders. Borders that have been “invisible” for a long time are temporarily reinstated between European states, and the domestic politics of European states have started to undermine the Schengen agreement, an agreement that

8 In an advertisement, the Trump campaign used video from the Melillan border fence to address illegal migration.

originally was made to replace internal borders with one common external border.

A border serves as a state's mechanism to control what and who is allowed to enter and exit its territory. Max Weber's definition of the state is “an agency within a society which possesses the monopoly of violence” (Gellner, 1990 [1983], p. 3). Although not wrong, this definition has some shortcomings, and Ernest Gellner builds on Weber's definition to define how

The state is the specialization and concentration of order maintenance. The 'state' is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order... the state exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces, have been separated out from the rest of social life. They *are* the state.

(1990 [1983], p. 4).

Seeing the state as an entity of order maintenance is useful in a discussion of borders. However, another feature of the state needs to be included when discussed in the context of borders. What happens at the border rarely stay at the border, and the “problem” with border crossings often first appear after the border has been crossed. This, I will argue, is because of the state's role of a biopower. Michel Foucault argued how governments in the 18th century

... were not simply dealing with subjects, or even a “people”, but with a “population,” with its specific phenomena and peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illness, patterns of diet and habitation.

(Foucault, 1978, p. 25)

Foucault argued that the role of the state has changed, and that the “old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (1978, p. 139-140). The state continued to seek to control its population, but now through the management of life rather than of death. When considering the state's responsibility towards subjects within its sovereignty, it is important to define the population (as the legal residents of a state, permanent or temporary). A short example that will be elaborated in chapter 3 can be used as an illustration. There are frequent attempts from Sub-Saharan Africans to scale the fence that

surrounds Melilla from Morocco. Those who attempt to do so are regularly wounded in their attempts to make it across the fence, either from the fence itself, or from the brutality of police forces guarding both sides of the border. However, if they make it past both the fence and the guards, and register at the local immigrant center, they will receive shelter, clothing and medical attention paid by the same state that paid those who tried to stop them, often just a few minutes earlier. This reveals that the border is more than a fence, and the border extends to the immigrant center. In this thesis, I will use the concept of the frontier to explore the area that stretches above and beyond the border.

The border as the point where one state ends and another begin is, despite nation-states tendency to imagine themselves as old (Eriksen, 2010a, p. 122), in constant flux. Melilla serves as an example, as it was taken as a consequence of the “reconquest” of Al-Andalus, and later served as a stronghold of Spanish expansion into Morocco during the time of the protectorate (1911-1956). During the time of the protectorate, the border took a somewhat different shape than usual, as the edges were decided politically, before the population in these areas had acknowledged that the Spanish state had the legitimate monopoly on life and death within the region that was now judicially Spanish. The problem was that the population (Rifians) did not feel belonging to the self-imposed state (Spain).

Belonging to the state is a matter of legal and judicial citizenship. Passports and legal documents do however seldom evoke national sentiments, something which draws the attention to the how the state is formed as an imagined community, i.e. a nation.

Boundaries

The critical focus of our investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses.

The boundary to which we must give our attention are of course social boundaries, though they may have their territorial counterparts.

(Barth, 1982 [1969], p. 15)

One of Carmen González Enríquez informants states that “We (the population of Spanish origin) will leave the town when we become a minority” (Enríquez, 2007, p. 224). The statement is partly a result of a fear that a Muslim majority in Melilla would be in favor of giving the Spanish enclaves to Morocco (Enríquez, 2007, p. 225). Anthropologist Simon

Harrison argues that ethnic groups often see themselves in conflict because of their relative similarity rather than their differences (Harrison, 1999, p. 239). Maintenance of an ethnic or social boundary will as a consequence be based on exaggerated external difference to avoid internal “pollution”. Similarities are obscured to illuminate differences (Harrison, 2003, p. 345). Harrison argues that group A exists in relation to group B, because “it is only when people identify with one another that a felt need can arise to differentiate themselves” (Harrison, 2003, p. 345). In Melilla this is seen through the way two presumed distinct social groups claim belonging to the same social category, as Spanish. The “We” Enríquez' informant is speaking about is challenged, and this is done through a competing discourse; the old separation between us and them becomes a new “we”. This competing discourse of group membership is partly due to the proximity of the “homeland” of the Spanish Muslim population. Another of Enríquez' informants states that “When they (Muslims) speak about the King, you do not know if they are speaking about the (Spanish) King Juan Carlos I or about the (Moroccan) King Mohammed VI” (Enríques, 2007, p. 225). The statements offered by Enríquez' informants serve as a useful foundation to discuss boundaries and group membership in Melilla. Fredrik Barth argued that it is the ethnic (or social) boundary that should be in the center of investigation of ethnic organization, and not the “cultural stuff that it encloses” (1982 [1969], p. 15). The importance of culture is acknowledged by Barth, but as an “implication or result, rather than a primary and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organization” (1982 [1969], p. 11). Culture does matter, but as Barth further argues, “we can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities and differences” (1982 [1969], p. 14).

Boundaries exist in multiple shapes, and their common denominator is as a separator of two or more things. Michèle Lamont and Virág Molnár separates between symbolic and social boundaries (2002, p. 168). Here, “symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people and practices, and even time and space” (Lamont and Molnàr, 2002, p. 168). Through symbolic boundaries, distinctions are made between those within and those outside the group, and form a group feeling. This symbolic classification follows a logic of differing between dichotomous pairs, such as between the distinguished and the vulgar, and the pure and impure (Lamont and Mòlnar, 2002, p. 172). The distinction is made silently⁹, and “the native of any culture naturally thinks of himself

9 In the words of Bourdieu, “the tradition is silent, not at least about itself as a tradition...” (1977, p. 167).

as receiving passively his ideas of power and in the universe, discounting minor modifications he himself may have contributed.” (Douglas, 1966, p. 5). If the symbolic boundary succeed in becoming widely acknowledged, it can become what Lamont and Molnár call a social boundary (2002, p.169). The social boundary differs from the symbolic boundary through the way it can give unequal access and distribution of resources, which can take shape as “identifiable patterns of social exclusion or racial segregation” (Lamont and Molnàr, 2002, p. 169). This definition of the social boundary is similar to Barth's definition of the ethnic boundary, as the ethnic group (or social) is defined through distinctions that are socially effective (1982 [1969], p. 13). The relationship between social and ethnic boundaries is important in this thesis, as they both overlap and are seen as distinctive. Spaniards and Rifians are both recognized as ethnic groups, but in Melilla, both belong to the social group Spanish and Melillan. Spanish Muslims can thus be categorized as Muslims (social), Spanish (social) or Rifians (ethnic), but these categories might also be aggregated to one identity (as for example Melillans, a social group that does not necessarily follow ethnicity, although this is contextual). Other attributes of ethnic identity are based on language, shared culture, and being biological self-perpetuating (Barth, 1982 [1969], pp. 10-11). Barth does not dispose these other distinctions by focusing on what he calls the socially effective organization of ethnic groups, and the mentioned attributes have the ability to (re)produce ethnic and social distinctions.

Language and religion are important attributes of group membership in Melilla. The majority of the inhabitants in Melilla speak Spanish, or are bilingual and speak Spanish and the local language Tarifit, also known as Rifian or Tamazight. Those who speak Tamazight belong to the Rifian ethnic group, and most Rifians are Muslims. However, the most important feature of group membership in Melilla is nationality, and perceived nationality. I separate nationality in two forms, judicial and social (formal and informal). I explored some aspects of judicial nationality in the previous section. What is of interest at this point is social nationality. Contrary to judicial nationality, i.e. having citizenship, social nationality entails having the feeling that one belongs to a certain place. Ernest Gellner offer two temporary definitions of a nation (and thus nationality), as it is either based on culture, “where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating”, or when “two men are of the same nation if and

only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation” (1990 [1983], p. 7). Gellner's second definition of the nation is similar to Barth's definition of ethnic boundaries, where membership is based on self-identification and identification by others “as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order” (1982 [1969], p. 11). These definitions are challenged when members of an ethnic or social group, such as the Rifians, are multilingual and belong to several social groups. Linguistic and religious differences might be overcome through various techniques and mechanisms for including scattered populations within a geopolitical bordered territory.

National identity is formed through nationalism. Gellner defined nationalism as “a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” (1990 [1983], p. 1). Nationalism as a process seeks to incorporate large and often scattered populations into a single seemingly homogenous population, and is a process that seeks to (re-)produce the nation (Anderson, 2006 [1983], pp. 5-6). The object, Benedict Anderson famously argued, is to turn the nation into an imagined political community (2006 [1983], pp. 5-6). Thomas Hylland Eriksen has analyzed how Norwegian nationalism was shaped through a process of bringing elements from rural values and symbols, and incorporating them into Norwegian society as expressions of the “authentic” Norwegian national character (2010a, p. 122). The symbolic boundary of the yet to become independent nation-state was expanded to include features from around the country in one package, now presented as a “taken for granted” common national culture. By constructing a synthesis of regional culture, a package called national culture was presented. Even though the nation is imagined as a united entity, its extension is limited by its outer borders, and even the “most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation...” (Anderson, 2006 [1983], p. 7). Despite being an imagined community, and often consisting of scattered and often culturally and linguistically distinctive populations, the distribution of national identity is limited, and following Harrison, it can be argued to be a scarce resource (Harrison, 1999, p. 246).

There are several forms of nationalism. Eriksen sees how two types of nationalism, formal and informal, exist as a dual phenomenon, “with its crucial loci in the formal state organization and in the informal civil society” (1993, pp. 1-2). The two types of nationalism are both distinctive and complementary (Eriksen, 1993, p. 2). As an example of informal

nationalism, Eriksen shows how an international sports event transcended ethnic boundaries, and united Mauritius in a way that formal nationalism could not (Eriksen, 1993, p. 9-10). National sentiments evoked through informal events are not independent from formal state nationalism, but revolve around belonging to a common nation(-state), or imagined community. The athletes in an international sports festival might be from the other side of the county, but it is the other side of my country.

Benedict Anderson borrows Hugh Seton-Watson's term "official nationalism" to explain another type of nationalism (Anderson, 2006 [1983], p. 86). Official nationalism is more akin to Eriksen's formal nationalism, and is defined as a "willed merger of nation and dynastic empire" (Anderson, 2006 [1983], p. 86). Official nationalism is hence a form of implementing national identity to those within the nation-state, and is similar to the way Eriksen sees that a "successful nationalism implies the linking of an ethnic ideology with the state apparatus" (Eriksen, 2010a, p. 131). Through official nationalism, the heterogeneous and scattered population within a territorial boundary (i.e. border) is united through a policy of common heritage and ancestry. The nation is however not a self-evident entity, and "every nation must have its history, its own collective memory. This remembering is simultaneously forgetting: the nation, which celebrates its antiquity, forgets its historical recency" (Billig, 1995, p. 38). Official nationalism is a nation's celebration of itself, and might be marked through flags, national holidays and military parades. Markers of informal nationalism are often less obvious. In Melilla, nothing defines one more as a Spaniard than doing nothing but eating and relaxing in the early afternoon during the siesta¹⁰. Walking through Melilla between in the afternoon, between 13.30 and 16.30, I would rarely encounter others than those who had to work in the few stores that were open and Moroccan day laborers. One Spanish informant, a man about my own age whom served in the army, had an almost religious relationship to Spanish ham, and could tell in detail how it was different from foreign ham. And obviously, no one would think of making the paella with foreign rice.

Bodies

As of today, all individuals are equipped with bodies. Alice Nah argues that there are two

¹⁰ This tradition has recently been "threatened", as the sitting prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, has suggested to end the tradition of the siesta to increase economic efficiency and promote gender equality.

factors that manifest individual identity at the border (2007, p. 38). Age, ethnicity, gender, religion and so forth are the socio-biological identity of the individual, while documentation “conform their politico-legal identity” (Nah, 2007, p. 38). Migration challenges the border when those passing through travel without legal documents stating their “actual identity”. Migrants, as “stateless” persons hereby “occupy an interdeterminate position, that of being (il)legal” (Nah, 2007, p. 39). As a response to migration politics, some of my informants acquired strategies of flexible identities. This was especially the case with Moroccan illegal migrants, whom often lied about their age and country of origin in order to be able to stay legally in Melilla, as this is not possible as an undocumented Moroccan adult. In these cases, an attempt was made to reconstruct the documented identity of the individual’s body, as their posed identities were registered into databases that linked their documentation to photos and more importantly, fingerprints. One man claimed to be from Mauritania when he was arrested, whilst another posed as an Algerian, although everyone knew, and could hear, that he came from a city in west Morocco. These attempts were seldom successful, and in chapter 3, I will see how Spanish border guards challenged the documented identity of a Moroccan migrant as his bodily appearance did not “match” his documented identity.

While appropriation of identity might work in the process of passing through borders, it can be fatal if false identification is presented upon applying for asylum. Khalid Ahmed, a Norwegian local politician, was expelled in 2015 after admitting to have presented a false country of origin upon his arrival in 2002 (NTB, 2015). The case shows how the border is extended through documentation, and how integration as an individual in a society (inclusion within a social boundary) is trumped by the paper trail of the individual. To analyze this, we might take an analytical position of seeing bodies as individual; the political and social status of the body has the potential to exist in friction.

The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben differs between *zoe* and *bios*, borrowing a distinction from ancient Greek philosophers (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). According to Agamben, the “fundamental categorical pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, *zoe/bios*, exclusion/inclusion” (Agamben, 1998, p. 12). *Bios* indicate “the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). If *zoe* is the state of exception, *bios* can be seen as those whom lead their life according

to the principles of a social group. I will relate bios to membership of different groups, and these groups might correspond to either the border, as citizens, or to the social boundary as members of, for example, an ethnic or social group.

Zoe is defined by Agamben as “the simple fact of living common to all living beings”, and is “included in the form of the exception, that is, something that is included solely through its exclusion” (1998, p. 13). Following the categorical pair, bare life (zoe) stands as the opposite of political existence (bios). Agamben demonstrates how the Jews in Nazi Germany became “denationalized” through law, as they lost their right to citizenship, something that “erased their rights as legal subjects” (Raulff, 2004, p. 610; Agamben, 1998, p. 78). The precondition to perform the massive genocide was denationalization, by terminating their political existence. The denationalization of the Jews during the Holocaust serves as an extreme example of zoe, and shows how bios and zoe exists in a dialectic, where it is possible to be “converted” from one form into the other. Another example is given by Didier Fassin, who argues that

economic transformations in the Western world has made immigrants into workers without work, deprived of the only activity left for them... the body expresses no more than what Giorgio Agamben calls 'bare life' – existence reduced to its physical expression or, in this case, the recognition of the human being through its pathology.

(Fassin, 2001, p. 5).

In Agamben's work, an extreme example of zoe takes the form of *Homo Sacer*, “the man who may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (1998, p. 12). One of the reasons that *Homo Sacer* cannot be sacrificed, an action that would make him sacred, is the fact that he is already sacred (Agamben, 1998, p. 48). The Latin the meaning of the word “sacer” means “sacred and damned” (Agamben, 1998, p. 50), and the sacred man (*Homo Sacer*) is “an outcast, a banned man, tabooed, dangerous... originally the word may have meant taboo, i.e. removed out of the region of the *profanum* without reference to a deity, but 'holy' or accursed according to the circumstances” (W. Ward Fowler in Agamben, 1998, p. 51). In my adaptation, zoe does not need to take the form of *Homo Sacer*, but might also be a position in which the body is partly excluded from the state or a social group, and stripped of certain rights.

In *The History of Sexuality*, Michel Foucault defined biopolitics as regulatory controls the state use for “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault, 1978, pp. 139-140). Biopolitics replaced the way sovereign power used to be symbolized by death, as “there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of the era of 'biopolitics'” (Foucault, 1978, p. 140). Agamben follows Foucault and argues that the concentration camp serves as “the most exemplary case of biopolitics” (Agamben, 1998, p. 10). By stripping German Jews of their rights as citizens, converting them from bios to zoe, the state no longer had responsibility for the life of the Jews as bios in their biopolitics. They were reduced to bare life, but nevertheless still included in the (bio)politics of the state. Biopolitics thus encompass all life within the sovereign territory of a state, and those who are excluded are included into the politics of the state through their exclusion (Agamben, 1998, p. 13). My adaption of biopolitics in this thesis follows Foucault's notion of the state as a biopower, and I see how the state is responsible for the lives of those whom reside (preferably legally) within the geopolitical border. Biopolitics has furthermore been seen as operating together with a zoepolitics¹¹, which is “primarily directed towards persons outside the state, as becomes visible, for instance, in the reduction to bare life of those detained in Guantanamo bay and in the administrative detention of 'illegal aliens'” (Aas, 2011, p. 339). Zoepolitics is consequently seen as the state's “ability to kill by expelling life from the sphere of legal protection” (Aas, 2011, p. 339). I will however not use the term zoepolitics, as the zoe is already included through its exclusion in my understanding. Ruben Anderson has critiqued the use of Agamben and the concepts of bare life and homo sacer, and states that “a critic” has accused Agamben of being “less interested in life than in its 'bareness'” (Anderson, 2014, p. 170). It is a fact that Agamben deals more with zoe than bios in “Homo Sacer”, but then again, it is the figure Homo Sacer whom is the protagonist of his book (Agamben, 1998, p. 12). Anderson's critique sees bare life (zoe) and political existence (bios) in a contrasting relationship, and he notes how “border controls are as much about the power to “let live”, the other side of Agamben's notion of bare life – a vulnerable life that can be rescued in action, just as it can be killed in omission” (2014, p. 142). Anderson's critique is important, and introduces some interesting questions

11 Zoepolitics is only mentioned once in *Homo Sacer*, as “*zoē politikē*”, and here it is mentioned in the context of how it was not relevant in ancient Athens (1998, p. 9).

to Agamben's categorical pair. Is it the political existence of refugees and migrants that excludes them from passing borders and being included as citizens (bios) in a biopower? This understanding must however be developed over more than a few sentences, and in this dissertation, I will relate to the categorical pair of zoe and bios in a less categorical way than what Anderson does.

I will further split the categorical pair into social and political bios¹², and social and political zoe. To understand how the different variations of zoe and bios is distributed, I find Barth's analytical method of differing between ascription by self and ascription by others useful (Barth, 1982 [1969], p. 13).

Political bios is in my interpretation distributed by the state. Through biopolitics, the individual is formed as a citizen with certain rights and obligations. The state sets the premise for who is to be included or excluded. Political bios in modern nation states is affirmed through citizenship. In a state of perfect biopolitics, all subjects within the border would be political bios, and in this way metaphorically and literally accounted for. The process of acquiring citizenship as a foreign citizen (or stateless person) is a process in which the individual is potentially converted from being a political zoe into a political bios, and incorporated into the biopolitics of the state they are in. A question related to this was raised in a Norwegian newspaper in February 2016, when a Norwegian-Afghan asked if she was more worth than other Afghans because of her Norwegian passport, and implicitly Norwegian citizenship (Ansari, 2016). The double standards she brought up relates to my separation of political and social bios, the latter being defined by ethnicity and/or belonging to a social group. While the Norwegian government expelled Afghans¹³ back to a country that was presumed to be sufficiently safe, the author, who was working in Afghanistan, received calls from the Norwegian embassy recommending her to leave Kabul. The answer to her question of whether she, as a Norwegian citizen, was more worth than other Afghans from the point of view of the Norwegian government seems to be yes, as holding a citizenship, a precondition for holding a passport, is the most powerful feature of the political bios, and holding a passport and citizenship (often) entails a responsibility of the state to preserve the lives included in their biopolitics.

12 Agamben uses the term political bios, but does not really develop it. (Agamben, 1998, pp. 13, 56)

13 They were seen as citizens (political bios) in Afghanistan, and aliens (political zoe) in Norway.

Passports are state-issued documents that identify individual bodies as citizens. Yet their function is to allow the bodies they identify – often conditional on other documents such as visas – to leave their state of citizenship.

(Jansen, 2009, p. 815)

Legalizing the body through legal documentation is seen as a necessity for the state to keep track of its inhabitants. Passports operate as an extension of citizenship, and allow the citizen to legally move beyond the confines of his homeland. The passport is the most important document for international mobility, and recently, passports have been equipped with biometric data. Biometric passports can include data such as the fingerprints of the holder. This connection makes the body become a part of the passport, rather than the previous situation in which the passport was an extension of the body, and as a result “the body becomes... a passport or a password and an unambiguous token of truth” (Aas, 2011, p. 341).

Social bios is, like the social boundary, more open for negotiation than political bios. Contrary to how political bios (as documented identity) is regulated by the state, social bios entails a form of membership that is more often than not undocumented. Social bios and zoe are related to the dynamics I discussed in regards to social and symbolic boundaries, as social bios is based on having knowledge of certain practices and symbols of a social group. Now I find it useful to bring ethnicity back into the equation, as it is relevant for my empirical data. As Nah argues, the socio-biological body is shaped through age, ethnicity, religion and other factors (2007, p. 38). These are some of the attributes that define the body as social bios. Some social groups might partially overlap, but vary in other aspects. In Melilla, social groups and identity is often based on ethnicity, although expressed as religion (the Muslims and the Christians). As I will show in chapter 4 and 5, both Spaniards and Spanish Muslims ascribe to the same identity, but the latter is often neglected or referred to as Moroccans or Muslims, as opposed to the real Spaniards. In this particular relationship, the Spanish Muslims take the form of social zoe, as they are in fact included into the social boundary of the social group Spaniards, through their exclusion. The exclusion is not necessarily absolute, as there is a threshold between zoe and bios, but the social boundaries of some of the Spaniards I encountered seemed to depend upon the

presence of Spanish Muslims as the Other.

Summary of framework

In this chapter I have presented the theoretical scaffolding for my dissertation. I find Fassin's separation of borders and boundaries is fruitful, as it cannot be taken for granted that the social boundary is congruent with the border, but that they nevertheless exist in relation to each other. Borders serve as the outer edge of the entity known as a nation-state. Boundaries are not necessarily operated by the state, although there are instances of state endorsed nationalism that serves to create an imagined community of people within a nation-state. Anderson's (2006 [1983]) concept of the imagined community is helpful to see how scattered populations can perceive themselves as unified, and how this is done through how Harrison's (1999a) argues that perceived differences are often the result of felt similarities. Internal differences are obscured, and external differences exaggerated.

I have followed Alice Nah's distinction in acknowledging two important markers of identity when crossing the border, documentation and the body. I have further incorporated this distinction into Agamben's (1998) categorical pair of bios and zoe, to separate between those inside and outside. Bios and zoe have been separated into social and political bios. The social and political bios might coincide, in the same ways as the social boundary often corresponds to the border. In this chapter I have seen how political bios/zoe is connected to the border, whilst social bios/zoe is connected to the social boundary.

Chapter 3. Crossing borders

... borders exist *in tension*; they not only have the capacity to produce but are, in themselves, produced (and reproduced constantly) through negotiation, conflict, and amity between the different stakeholders.

(Nah, 2007, p. 37).

Julia, an American student studying in peninsular Spain, once went to Morocco on a day-trip while visiting Melilla, and forgot to “close the visa” when exiting. At the airport in Melilla, Julia was refused to fly back to mainland Spain, as she “was still” in Morocco. Had it not been for the exception in the Schengen agreement that excludes Melilla and Ceuta, this would probably not have been discovered before her trip back home to the US from the Spanish mainland. Obviously disappointed, Julia had to make her way back to the border to get the required stamp, before finally going back to her place of study in peninsular Spain. The practice of stamping passports to verify the legal presence of a person within a foreign country shows how an individual can be semi-incorporated into a country in which he or she is not native. By not physically stamping out of Morocco, Julia was still judicially within Morocco, despite physically being in Spain. What is interesting about her case is that she was not illegally in Spain, nor in Morocco. Due to her American citizenship, she was not fully incorporated to either of the two countries in question, but by not stamping out of Morocco, she was, according to her documents, in two places at once. By digitally registering aliens whom enter, with or without documentation, the state has the potential of gaining control of the subjects within the nation-state. If done to a full extent, the state would have total control of the subjects within their territory, as all those staying within the borders of a country would have a status of political bios in their biopolitics. The obligation Julia had to obtain an exit stamp when leaving Morocco did not merely consist of getting carefully designed ink in her passport, but was also necessary to officially exit the sovereignty of Morocco, in this case, not only physically, but formally through signing out of the sovereign administrative database. Visas obtained at the border into Morocco are valid for three months, and overstaying such visa would convert the status of the person from a legally registered subject, in the form of political bios, into an illegal alien, or in the framework of this thesis, political zoe.

In this chapter I will analyze various border scenarios to see how the border is perceived

and acted upon differently by different people and groups. First, I will discuss the practical and some legal implications of the border and border maintenance. Next, I will analyze Spaniards who cross the border from Melilla and go to Morocco for recreational purposes, with a hiking group as an empirical example. Moroccan and Spanish citizens living in the surrounding Moroccan region or Melilla have day visas to visit the neighboring countries, and after the hiking group, and I will present Moroccan citizens who go to Melilla for both recreation and work. Lastly, I analyze migrant groups who enter Melilla, with a focus on Moroccan migrants.

In this chapter, I will see how the border not only is a place that separates two sovereign nations, but is also extended through time and space.

The border, power and territorial integrity

In 1998, a fence was constructed around Melilla as a response to increased migration (Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 112). The increased migration was in part a result of Spain's incorporation to the EU (then the European Community, EC) in 1986. Today, the fence is in fact two six meter high fences with a complex wire system in the middle. In 2013, barbed wire was attached to the fence, but this does not seem to stop those who attempt to pass, and the ones who make it across the fence arrive more wounded than before.

There are four legal crossing points between Melilla and Morocco. My data is primarily from the border between Melilla and the neighboring city Beni Ansar, which is the main crossing point. Together with Farkhana, Beni Ansar is the only crossing that can be passed with a vehicle. The Barrio Chino crossing is situated between the two, and is exclusively for pedestrians, and the last border is close to the forest Rostrogordo. Crossing the Beni Ansar border from the Spanish side, one might start seeing oneself strolling down the wide Avenida Europa, a long and open avenue with trees on each side, with a huge Spanish flag at the end. The area around the border itself is often filled with petty traders selling fruits, vegetables and tobacco, and on weekends there is a second hand market in immediate proximity to the border crossing. A regular crossing consists of walking on the right hand side of the road, where the pedestrian lane is situated. On weekends, Spanish border guards check the contents of the bags of the people crossing. After exiting through a rotating metal gate, one is officially outside Spain (and Europe), and has entered what is

supposed to be an international zone. Today, this international zone is under Moroccan jurisdiction, and is usually populated by a mixture of border guards and civilian Moroccans whom either want to sell visa-papers to tourists, that needs to be filled out in order to enter Morocco, or Moroccans who wish to enter Spain (both legally and illegally).

The no-man's-land has been debated amongst both high ranking officials and by border guards. A video recording from 2012 show Spanish and Moroccan border guards arguing about the perimeter of the zone between Morocco and Spain at the Beni Ansar border (sebtamelila maroc, 2012)¹⁴. It is not clear what has happened, but in the video, Moroccan and Spanish guards are standing at a gate by the Spanish border, and one of the Spanish guards claims “No es Marruecos, esta es zona internacional” – “this is not Morocco, this is an international zone”. The sound in the video is polluted by wind, but the message becomes clear as one of the Spanish border guards takes two steps into what the Moroccan border guards see as part of their sovereign territory. A Moroccan border guard steps forward and takes the Spanish border guard by the arm while pushing him back towards the gate and pointing down at the zone were Spain supposedly ends. Responding to what just happened, the Spanish border guard repeats what his colleague said; the area is an international zone and not Morocco. Throughout the incident, language barriers reveal themselves, and culminate as a Spanish border guard in the heat of the discussion asks the Moroccans if they speak English, after having communicated in Spanish. In 2010, the president of Melilla, Juan José Imbroda asked the Spanish government to clarify with the Moroccan government that the zone at Beni Ansar is an international zone (El Mundo, 2010). In the statement, Imbroda accuses Morocco of taking control over the no-man's-land little by little, and by doing so, violating international treaties between Morocco and Spain. As of 2015, the zone remains Moroccan, but it is possible to enter the zone from the Spanish side without registering or showing any passport. This is first done when reaching the large Moroccan fence that separates the “international” zone from Moroccan sovereign territory, something which of course makes the argument that the international zone is Moroccan somewhat paradoxical.

The economic differences between Spain and Morocco is an important reason for many who cross the border, both for those who cross on a daily basis, and for those who wish to

¹⁴ The user name in itself is interesting, as Sebt is the Moroccan name for Ceuta, and Melila, is the Moroccan name for Melilla.

go to the peninsula. Spain had a GDP per capita of 33,000 USD in 2014 (CIA, 2015). In comparison, Morocco's GDP per capita estimated to be an estimated 7,700 USD the same year (CIA, 2015). The numbers tells us that there is a difference, but not what this is. GDP stands for gross domestic product. The GDP includes variables such as consumption, investments and exports/imports. As an extension of the discussion of countries as geopolitical units surrounded by borders, GDP can be seen as one of the most operable distinctions between two or more countries, as it is calculated to an actual figure. Melilla is under a special tax regime that removes value added tax (VAT) from all goods, making goods entering through the port of Melilla cheaper than elsewhere in Spain, and in Morocco (Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 114). This comparative advantage has led to a high degree of trade between Melilla and Morocco. Or to be more precise, huge quantities of goods go through Melilla and into Morocco. It is estimated that as many as 45,000 people are involved in this irregular trade between Melilla and Morocco, and the value of the goods crossing the border from Melilla to Morocco is calculated to be between 440-1000 million euros per year (Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 114; Enríquez, 2007, p. 222). The trade between Moroccans in the surrounding region and Melilla made one Moroccan informant state that Melilla was in fact the economic capital of northern Morocco. Irregular trade amounts to a large loss in tax income for Moroccan authorities (Elcano, 2014, p. 154). Morocco does not recognize Melilla and Ceuta as legal entities, and therefore do not enforce a commercial border (Enríquez, 2007, p. 222). The Moroccan claim on Melilla, Ceuta, and the small islands located right off its coast, came immediately after its independence in 1956 (Trinidad, 2012, p. 961). Morocco has since unsuccessfully applied to the UN Decolonization Committee to include the Spanish territories into the list of non-self-governing territories¹⁵ (Trinidad, 2012, p. 966). To be included in the list, the area in question must be a territory “whose people have not yet to attained a sufficient measure of self-government” (Trinidad, 2012, p. 969). Morocco's claims on the enclaves have been supported by arguments of territorial unity, but “none have dared to argue explicitly that the wishes of the populations of Ceuta and Melilla should be set aside when determining the political future of those territories” (Trinidad, 2012, p. 970). Morocco's political act of not recognizing the existence of Spanish cities on what is seen as their integral sovereign

15 Western Sahara, currently occupied by Morocco, is included in the list as a non-self-governing territory, as the only remaining non-self-governing territory in Africa. Gibraltar, occupied by the UK, is the only European territory on the list.

territory is an interesting act of border maintenance. Or maybe, one might say that it is an act of not maintaining the border, but seen in context, it is done to maintain a political position. By neglecting the commercial border, Morocco suffers an economic loss, but it serves as a symbolic act that is unmeasurable in monetary terms. The current border does not correspond to the border imagined by Morocco, and the refusal to recognize the Spanish enclaves' serves as an example of how territory and the nation-state is constructed as intertwined.

The official position of Morocco towards the Spanish enclaves is clear. There is however a tendency to differ between what is said and what is done, and despite not officially recognizing the Spanish enclaves, Moroccan border guards are now situated all along the other side of the border fence between Moroccan and Melilla, and several instances have been reported where migrants have been stopped by Moroccan border guards before reaching the fence that surrounds Melilla.

Spaniards in Morocco – the hiking group

The border in Melilla reveals an asymmetry in the ways groups are able to cross the border, and their reasons for doing so. Because Melilla is a small and “fortified” city, many of its inhabitants travel to Morocco or the peninsula during weekends. Every other weekend, a hiking group in Melilla organized trips, mostly to Morocco, as the hiking opportunities in Melilla are limited. One February morning, the group assembled at a fancy cafe in Beni Ansar, five minutes walk from the border. The group was ranging from people in their mid-twenties to their late fifties, and ended up consisting of some fifty people. All of them were Spanish, either from Melilla or the peninsula, and most were dressed in hiking gear in bright pastel colors.

After eating a breakfast, the members of the group were split into the available cars. I joined some people I had met at the border, a group of young Spaniards who worked as teachers in Melilla. We got a ride with a guy in his fifties whom had been a military officer in the Spanish army, but had retired a couple of years back. He was wearing a signal yellow jacket and a brown cap, and looked pretty much like any average fifty-year-old man who likes hiking. Good equipment and decent physique. On the way towards our yet to be disclosed destination, we came to learn that he had lived in Melilla for twenty years, and as

we drove he told us about landmarks from the age of the Spanish Protectorate. As he pointed out different landmarks left from the protectorate, the passengers were reminded of a time past when the surrounding territory was part of their own sovereignty. We went past a group of cyclists on the way who turned out to be Spanish, who had left the confines of Melilla for the exact same reason as us, recreational space.

After driving for some time, we passed a bridge leading out of Nador province. I asked the driver about the legality of exiting the province, as the visa included in the local Spanish residency card (DNI) is limited to surrounding Nador province. “No worries,” he said, “as long as we are back by nightfall there will be no problem”. We drove along the Moroccan coast towards the city of Al-Hoceïma, a city established after Spanish military forces disembarked there during the Rif War in the 1925. We stopped after driving about halfway to Al-Hoceïma, and at the parking lot we were told that it was possible to see Sierra Nevada on the other side of the Alboran Sea.



Illustration 3: Hikers going up the ravine. Photo by author

As we started walking, a boy went past us with his flock of sheep. The contrast between the Spanish group of men and women and the young herder was striking, and served as an exotic and “authentic” experience for the hikers. In front of us was a deep ravine that we were to climb, and the group was carefully split into smaller groups by some of the older men whom had taken control. Somewhat like a herder tends to his flock, the group was led

through the ravine by the experienced hikers, and after a while they had conquered their first obstacle. In the mountains, we encountered some rundown stone huts. The huts turned out to be inhabited by people, another exotic feature that made the hike stop for five minutes to take pictures of an old smiling woman who lived there with her donkey. As the group ventured through the mountains, the people who lived there were turned into passive cultural objects in their own home, something which was reinforced by the fact that neither could communicate with the other. On one hand, it was nice to see the small hamlet and the people whom occupied it in the Rif Mountains. However, as the whole group drew up their mobile phones to take pictures, the situation was turned into an “attraction”, as if it was strange that we encountered people whom, if the condition of their house was an indication, had stayed there for years. Everyone seemed happy to have come across a part of “authentic” Moroccan culture on their way.

The hike lasted until early afternoon. On our way back we stopped by some hot springs to take a bath. The hot springs were located at the bottom of a hill, where steps had been constructed in order to make the trip down easier. All were happy and content. As we prepared to leave, a group of young Moroccan men had come out from a nearby house, and asked the car owners to pay a parking fee. Words about the fee quickly spread, but most of the group seemed oblivious to the situation. We drove away without paying the fee, as if it was an illegitimate claim from the young men. There were signs at the location, but as these were in Arabic, I could not understand what they said, and I have no way of telling if they requested a parking fee. Upon our return to Melilla, the driver and my co-passengers presented their DNI's to both the Moroccan and Spanish border guards, whilst I had to get my Moroccan exit stamp. When showing my passport to the Spanish border guard, I got the predictable response I always got when crossing, “No eres tú, es una mujer!” – “this is not you, it is a woman!”. When I got my passport some eight years ago, I had long hair, and now, the passport did no longer serve as a token of truth of who I was. As one of my friends was later told when crossing an international border, “if you change your face, you have to change your passport”. After the tour, the group met up in a local tapas bar to have drinks and discuss their day in the Moroccan hinterlands that once were part of Spain.

It was clear that the motivation of those who went hiking was to be in the outdoors, and their DNI's allowed them to explore the mountains of another country. Consequently, as

was case with the cyclists we passed, Morocco was used as recreational space. Anna L. Tsing tells a story that bears some resemblances to mine, after she went hiking with a group of cosmopolitans in Indonesia.

Every now and then we passed an elderly wrinkle-faced peasant, bent over completely at the waist and balancing a load of grass or wood that far exceeded the size of his or her frail body. But my companions carried frame packs and wore hiking boots and fashionable trousers with extra pockets on the outside for gear.

(Tsing, 2005, pp. 124-125)

Tsing further frames the activity of her co-hikers as nature-loving, and differs between the hikers and the old peasant by seeing how the former are “enjoying the wild and free nature” (Tsing, 2005, p. 125), as opposed to those whom reside in the area and simply live there. Hiking is a privileged activity. In itself, hiking does not need to be expensive, and differing between those who can join such venture and those who cannot is not entirely based on monetary wealth. Some of the hikers in the above described trip did of course have expensive equipment, but this is not really the point. Rather, I argue, the recreational use of the border by the hiking group shows a strong discrepancy in the use of the border, which depends on which side of the border one enters from. The hikers were able to cross the border due to an agreement made between Morocco and Spain in 1991, excepting Moroccans in the surrounding Melilla and Ceuta's surrounding regions from the regular visa requirements introduced that year (Soto Bermant, 2014, p. 113). The agreement is asymmetrical, because Moroccans holding day visas are limited to visiting Melilla, while Spaniards from Melilla are able to travel further into Morocco, as there are no internal checkpoints. By driving across the bridge, the group essentially left their political bios behind, and were turned into political zoe, illegal immigrants in Morocco. This would however not be an issue as long as the group returned to Spain before nightfall. The internal Moroccan border was thus seen as a symbolical border, and the perception of the temporary visa included in the national ID cards was seen as extended in time rather than space. Anne Norton has stated that “All frontiersmen are contemptuous of authority” (1993, p. 58), and this seems to have been the case with the hikers, if only for a short period of time.

Moroccan citizens and day visas; work and leisure

Moroccans and Spaniards who live in Melilla are permitted to visit the adjacent region on special day visas. Those with Spanish DNI's (Documento Nacional de Identidad) from Melilla are subject to control upon entering both Morocco and Spain. In theory, Moroccans are obligated to do the same, but are often waved through without showing any sort of documentation on the Moroccan side. This, I argue, has to do with their embodied identity. Two assumptions can be made. Moroccans who cross have, 1) already have shown their documents on a number of times, and their documented identity has been absorbed into their bodies, or 2) the bodily identity of those who cross, and a sort of "sixth sense" obtained by the border guards allows the guards to see who is Moroccan and who is not. In the first case, the political bios of the person has been incorporated into the body of the person, as the guards remembers who have passed through earlier. A relationship between bodily and documented identity is revealed, and show that those who work at the border are as important as judicial regulations in deciding who is allowed to enter and exit. The last proposition might seem far-fetched, but as will be discussed later, one informant who was expelled from Melilla, who was without papers, was allowed to re-enter Morocco without presenting any documentation. His identity as a member of an ethnic group, in other words his social bios, was accepted despite not holding legal papers. Observations from the Beni Ansar border support this argument, as ethnic Moroccans¹⁶ were often waved through, while people with other ethnicities were redirected to the security booths to get the required stamps.

Moroccans who enter Melilla on day visas can be separated in to two groups, those entering to work, and those entering to enjoy the facilities offered in Melilla. In the city center of Melilla, there is a school run by the Moroccan state, and kids from the surrounding region enter the city on a daily basis to attend (Karell, 2014, p. 196). Youssef, a man in his forties from a city further south in Morocco came to Melilla for both work and recreation. He had stayed in Nador for a many years, where he worked as a secretary in a governmental office. The job only gave him a meager income, and he would go into Melilla several times a week, where he earned extra cash by washing cars for a couple of euros. He did not have a girlfriend, he said, as he preferred to do "boom, boom, finished". There is a daily influx of

¹⁶ During Easter in 2015, the border controls at the Moroccan side tightened up, as Moroccans working in Europe, and people with relatives in Morocco, returned for holiday.

prostitutes crossing the border, and Youssef would often identify these as they went by. “If you have a house, sex is 20 euros, but if you don't, it costs 30 euros. Very expensive”. The street he stayed in is close by the Beni Ansar border, and in the late afternoon and evenings, it filled up with middle aged men who came in from the Nador province to drink alcohol, and occasionally sleep with prostitutes. The street in question formed a social arena amongst Moroccan men, and the small businesses located in the street thrived on the influx of men who crossed from the Moroccan side of the border to spend their money. Although there are some bars in the street, most men seemed to spend their time outside the small stores, as they offer the same goods, mainly beer, for a cheaper price. Drinking in public is illegal in Melilla, and police officers would stop by from time to time and make the public drinkers pour the contents of their bottles and cans to the ground. Arabic was the most frequently used language in the street, and there was a notable absence of ethnic Spaniards.

There are several streets and areas in Melilla that are mainly used by Moroccan day migrants and Spanish Muslims. In addition to the mentioned street, there is a weekly market on Fridays and Saturdays next to the Beni Ansar border, where people come to both buy and sell second hand goods. The market covers a large open space, and petty sellers bring tacked up carpets containing the goods, which are laid down on the ground. There is another market further up the road which also mainly consists of Moroccans who come in to sell fabrics and fake brand clothing¹⁷, and is also attended by Spaniards. In this market, offers are shouted out in Spanish, and euros are the main used currency, as opposed to Arabic (and Tamazight), and Moroccan dirhams in the other market.

David A. McMurray, who did fieldwork in Nador in the 1980s, analyzed smuggling and daily work migrations to the Melilla, and it seemed like little had changed since he did his fieldwork (McMurray, 2001). One American informant in McMurray's book stated that “someone at the state department told me once that the Moroccans are the Mexicans of Western Europe” (McMurray, 2001, p. 5). The statement simplifies reality, but it is true that many Moroccans have been to Western Europe the same as Mexicans have been to the US economy; a reliable external workforce. Many Moroccans from the surrounding region come to work in Melilla on a daily basis. It has been estimated that 20,000 people cross the

¹⁷ Most of these clothes, I was told, are made in Casablanca, the economic capital of Morocco.

border daily, out of which some 10,000 women work as servants in individual houses (Rodríguez-Martin, 2007, p. 6). In one area close to the border, activity increases towards the weekend, as men from Morocco come in to prepare goods that are sent back across the border. At the industrial area in vicinity to the border, men work outside small storage houses, and one of the activities consisted of compressing multiple car tires into one. Day laborers from Morocco earn small amounts of money in Melilla, and cleaners often receive between 200-300 euros per month. In comparison, a teacher in Melilla can earn up to ten times more, often between 2000 and 2500 euros. Still, these migrant workers might be seen as somewhat privileged as they have a relatively steady work and income.

The Barrio Chino border is mainly used by those carrying goods across the border, known as *porteadoras*, or carriers. It could be assumed that the name Barrio Chino implies a Chinese neighborhood, but according to my informants, this was not the case. The *porteadoras* are employed by people who buy goods in Melilla to sell in Morocco. Above the pedestrian lanes are illustrations of men and women carrying goods on their backs, as a reminder of who the border is for. *Porteadoras* are a frequent sight at the other border crossings as well, but it seems to be a specialty at the Barrio Chino border, and a newspaper article reports that there are as many as 5000 crossings per day through that particular border (Martínez, 2015). The *porteadoras* are mainly from the Nador province, and their daily work is made possible through the special visa agreement between the Moroccan region and Melilla that secures visa free passage. The *porteadoras* have become famous through international media, where they have been called “the mules of Melilla” (see for example Ramos 2015; Pressly, 2013). The translation from *porteadoras* to mules is likely done to make it newsworthy, and it must be noted that none of my informants, Spanish nor Moroccan, referred to the heavily loaded women and men carrying goods across the border as animals of any sort. A *porteadora* usually receive three euros for carrying a 60 kg bag across the border from Melilla to Morocco (Pressly, 2013). The variety of goods smuggled is too vast to elaborate here, but during my initial months, it seemed as if wool carpets were a popular good.

Although being framed as a migration hub, the fact is that the majority of migrants who enter Melilla are day laborers and Moroccans holding day visas. When crossing the border, the day laborers do not cross a social boundary, and as Moroccan citizens, they are not

included into the biopolitics of Spain (and seemingly not subject to Spanish labor laws).

Youssef did not mind the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, and was happy as long as he could enter and exit as he pleased. In Melilla, he had a group of friends with whom he could stay, and at one point, he stayed in Melilla for several weeks. The daily influx of people to the city has created areas, cafes and places which are mainly populated by Moroccan citizens and Spanish Muslims, and there is no clear congruency between the geopolitical border and the social boundary.

Migrants – life in limbo

Migrants who enter Melilla stay in the temporary immigrant center, the CETI. The CETI (Centro de Estancia Temporal de Inmigrantes) is located in immediate proximity to the Farkhana border, and is surrounded by a golf course, financed by the EU regional development fund¹⁸ to promote tourism. During day time, happy golfers drove their golf carts behind a fence where migrants had built an impromptu shack. There was always activity in front of the CETI, and news teams and activists were a regular sight with their cameras and microphones. Although originally built for 480 people, the center usually held between 1500-2000 people. To increase the capacity, large military tents were set up just outside the CETI. The center itself is enclosed by huge metal fences, but it is hard to tell if this is to keep people out- or inside. Entrance to the center is regulated through a control point, where the residents are given food, shelter and clothing. The center does not limit the mobility of the people staying there, and those whom are registered receive a document that show that their presence in Melilla is legal, although temporary. Those registered at the CETI are only supposed to be there for a limited amount of time, but many stay for months, waiting for their application to be either accepted or declined. In this sense, CETI works as a *de facto* extension of the border, as one rather than being either inside or outside is stuck in limbo.

In early 2015, the CETI was filled with far more people than its capacity, leading its residents to spend much time outside the center. Syrians and Kurds usually stayed on the opposite side of the road passing in front of the center, where some men had constructed an ad hoc cafe. At the cafe they sold kebabs, sandwiches and tea, prepared over open fires

18 FEDER – Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional.

fueled by burning pallets found around the city. People usually spent the majority of their time with people from their own regions, but as they were surrounded by each other on a daily basis, there was a considerable amount of communication across groups and ethnicity. Although speaking different dialects, Moroccans and Syrians could communicate in Arabic, and as many Moroccans and Syrians know, or at least have some knowledge of, French, they could also talk to Sub-Saharan Africans from French-speaking countries. Interestingly, the heritage of European and Arab colonial history enabled groups from vastly different places in the world to communicate during their attempt to get to the countries that once colonized the territorial regions and countries they came from. Although the borders have changed, the language boundaries have remained. Perceived differences were still maintained, and one evening a dispute broke out between a Moroccan and a Senegalese, after the former had called him something along the lines of “stupid African”. “What do you mean?” the Senegalese replied, “you are African, you are from Africa, this is Africa!” The Moroccan fiercely stated that he was not African, but most of the others in the gathering seemed to agree that they were in fact in Africa.

The fence that surrounds Melilla has been constructed to curb migration in general, but in effect, it is mainly Sub-Saharan Africans who need to climb the two six meter fences to enter Melilla. The attempts to scale the fence are known as “Salto la Valla”, or fence jumps, in Melilla, and between January and mid-April in 2015, I registered thirteen attempts to scale the fences. The numbers are based on my collection of reports from local newspapers. There were an estimated total of 4924 persons tried to scale the fence over the thirteen attempts, out of which 99 people, or approximately 2%, made it past the fence and into Melilla. It must be assumed that some individuals tried to scale the fence more than once. The attempts to scale the fence usually occurred in the early morning hours, between four and six o'clock, and often consisted of between a couple of hundred to a thousand persons. Two attempts were made during the day in the period, both times with a smaller number of people, and in both instances the majority of people made it into Melilla. If successful, the migrants who have scaled the fence need to make their way to the CETI to be registered. There are a number of examples of people who have managed to scale the fence, before being captured by the border department (GRS¹⁹) of the Guardia Civil and returned to Morocco through doors in the fence. This practice is known as hot returns, or “devoluciones

19 Grupo Reserva y Seguridad – a rapid anti-disturbance force.

en caliente”. Successful attempts to scale the fence are known as “boza”, and on the morning after successful attempts, it would be the talk of the day at the CETI. After entering Melilla and getting registered at the CETI, migrants wait for their “salida”. “Salida” is Spanish for exit, and the migrants in Melilla use the term to describe the transportation to the mainland. Sub-Saharan Africans at the CETI seldom knew when their “salida” was going to be, and there was much frustration because of this.

Most of the Moroccan migrants in Melilla were young men who had crossed through the border at night. Their ability to cross the border is a result of the Moroccan annexation of the international zone in Beni Ansar. The migrants would wait by the border at night, before running across when they saw an opening. Amongst the migrant groups, I became most acquainted with the Moroccans. These young men did not have the possibility to apply for asylum or residence in Melilla, and claimed this to be because the Moroccan king had an agreement with Spain, as King Mohammed VI supposedly did not see the need for Moroccans to migrate. They all identified themselves as Moroccans, but were skeptic to possibilities offered by the Moroccan state, and in Morocco. When talking about the opportunities in Morocco, they would often personify the state through the king, and one man stated that the King of Morocco did not offer any future for Moroccans, as there was a lot of poverty in Morocco. The future they imagined in Europe was shaped by what they had seen on TV and the internet, and many had clear ideas about how they would get to Europe. One of my informants presented the route he intended to take towards his goal. “First, I will take the Armas boat to Motril, then Motril to Granada, Granada to Barcelona, Barcelona to Bilbao, then to France and Paris. After that, I will go to Germany and lastly to England. And there I will meet my girlfriend who I met on the internet”.

Wasim was a man in his early twenties, and had entered Melilla at night in early January. In Morocco, he studied English at his local university, but rather than focusing on his studies, he had played FIFA²⁰ and stayed with his friends. Through his studies he had learned English, and he was also fluent in Arabic and French. Wasim's father hoped that his son would become a police officer, but Wasim had his mind set on one thing; going to England. A few days after arriving to Melilla he had been picked up by local police, who took him to the station to register him into their database. As he traveled without papers,

20 FIFA is a well known football video game.

something most of the Moroccans do, he had lied about his age so that he could stay in the immigrant center for minors. Traveling without papers is a strategic choice for many migrants at the CETI and in Melilla, as their documented identities are seen as an obstacle rather than a means of securing their transfer to the mainland. Paperless migrants challenge the state as a biopower, as the newly arrived migrants needs to be identified. After a month or so at the migrant's center, Wasim left because he did not like the man in charge, and started living in the streets. In February, he stayed in some caves by the commercial port in Melilla. These caves were located below the lighthouse at the fortress, and offered both a semi-secluded space, and shelter. The only way Moroccan illegal migrants could apply for residence in Spain was to get to the peninsula, and every evening, the migrants would try to sneak onto trucks headed for mainland Spain with the night boat. These attempts to get to the mainland are dangerous, and the Moroccan migrants referred to them as "risiki", or to do "risiki". Stefania Pandolfo encountered the term in Rabat, while doing fieldwork on potential young Moroccan migrants, and states that "one says *kanriski*, 'I'm taking the risk', in a mixture of Arabic and French, to signify the clandestine departure, hidden in the bottom of a truck, or by hazardous sea passage..." (Pandolfo, 2007, p. 333). If the Moroccan migrants were captured on the boat to the mainland, they would be returned the same day, as they had not yet set foot on peninsular soil. Although doing "riski" was associated with certain dangers, Wasim and his friends also saw a potential reward on the other side, and the migrants all had clear intentions of what they were going to do once they reached the mainland. Some of Wasim's friends had clear goals, such as going to university or becoming a pilot. He himself was indecisive about what he would do, other than that he wanted to live in Europe.

Before an annual race in Melilla organized by the military regiment La Legión, the caves at the port were raided by Guardia Civil, something that happened a couple of times a year, and Wasim and his friends moved to a shack they built in the vicinity of the CETI. Soon after, he was arrested at the port by the police. At the police station, he claimed to be the son of Sub-Saharan African and Indian parents, but was revealed when the police found his fingerprints in their database. Although the database claimed him to be a minor, the police officers decided that he was an adult, and he got 48 hours to leave the city. Wasim did not oblige. Staying in Melilla illegally required continuous adaption, and after being arrested by

the police a couple of times, Wasim limited his visits to the city center. “It was easier when I was a minor”, he complained, referring to his previous legal status in Melilla. He continued his attempts to sneak aboard trucks going to the peninsula, but repeatedly failed, while more and more of his friends managed to get to the peninsula. In late March, his father, who knew Wasim was staying in Melilla, came to the city to search for him. Wasim had heard this was about to happen, and avoided the city center for a couple of days, before he heard through friends that his father had returned to Morocco. In April, Wasim was arrested for the last time, and immediately expelled from Melilla. This time, he was brought to the Spanish border by Beni Ansar, and led across to the Moroccan side. He had not brought any documentation of his identity, but was allowed to reenter. With no money, he called a friend from his city who came to Beni Ansar to pick him up the next day. He had reacquired the status of political bios, although on the wrong side of the Mediterranean.

The migrants in Melilla were all subject to the same border, but the extension of the border was different for the different groups. The synthesis of Agamben's (1998) categorical pair of bios/zoe with Nah's (2007) documented and bodily identity at the border described in chapter two helps understand how different groups are subject to different controls at the same border. The Sub-Saharan African group is excluded until they reach the CETI and get registered. Two variables work against their opportunity to cross the border. Sub-Saharan Africans are almost exclusively the ones who enter Melilla by climbing the fence, and this is largely due to how their bodily identity, as black Africans, prevents them to enter through the regular border crossing in the same way as the Moroccans and Syrians. They are distinguishable from the Moroccans who are able to stay in the no-man's-land through their appearance, and are as such social zoe. Because of their treatment in both Morocco and Melilla, many Sub-Saharan Africans have a strong dislike for both Moroccans and Spaniards²¹, and few intend to stay in Spain after getting their “salida”. Secondly, is the fact that they travel without documentation, an international necessity when crossing borders. In Agambian terms, traveling without papers makes them political zoe. Undocumented bodies pose a threat to the biopolitics of the state, as the biopower is unable to verify the “actual identity” of those who enter their sovereign territory (this is problematic for the biopolitics as the state does not know if the person has any potential illnesses, crime

21 One man who did not want to say where he was from said he could talk to me, as I was neither Moroccan or Spaniard.

records etc.). Upon arriving at the immigration center, the migrants are temporarily semi-incorporated into the biopolitics of the Spanish state, and receive a temporary resident card. Because of their lack of documentation, processing their applications takes time, and many stay in Melilla between two months and a year. If their applications are accepted, they are incorporated into the Spanish state as political bios, legal citizens with all rights it implies, and can go to the mainland (and later Europe through the Schengen agreement).

Moroccans are a special case, as they were able, although illegally, to enter through the regular border, but did not have the right to apply for residency or asylum unless they were minors. The fence is highest for the Sub-Saharan Africans, as they are the only group that needs to scale them, but the threshold to enter Europe is broadest for the Moroccan illegal migrants, as they need to get to the peninsula before they are able to legally (although potentially temporally) stay in Spain. Wasim was able to reach the Spanish side of the border crossing due to his social, and thus embodied political, bios as a Moroccan.

However, when he started running across the border into Melilla, he ran away from his status as a legal citizen. Moroccan migrants who live in Melilla as political zoe are excluded from the biopolitics of Spain²², and because they are not able to apply for asylum in Melilla, they are unable to become potential political bios until they reach the mainland. The daily attempts to hide in trucks that are going to the mainland is the only option. Because of the ethnic frictions between Moroccan Arabs and Rifians, the young migrants also stay in Melilla as social zoe, and Wasim regularly expressed his suspicion towards the Spanish Muslim population. “You should not go to that neighborhood, it’s filled with Rifians. I do not go, they don’t like us”. Once, a young Rifian man tried to join the other Moroccan migrants in an attempt to do “riski”, but the they chased him away, because his people had not treated them (Moroccan Arab migrants) well, and consequently, they would not help him.

In 2014, 15 migrants who tried to swim from Morocco and into Melilla's sister enclave Ceuta drowned, reportedly as a result of being fired at with rubber bullets by the local Guardia Civil who attempted to keep them out (Kassam, 2015). Over the last years, thousands of migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea, and the 15 who drowned

22 However, if the migrants are injured, they might receive medical treatment. Wasim was hurt after an encounter with police once. They drove him to the hospital, where he got medical attention. Afterward, he went back to his shack outside the CETI.

off the coast of Ceuta could have been avoided. 16 officers from the Guardia Civil were investigated after the incident, but none were charged for having violated any laws, as they had operated within their mandate of protecting the Spanish border (Abad, 2015). In the words of Agamben, the migrants were men “who may be killed but yet not sacrificed” (1998, p. 12). Or rather, perhaps their death was a sacrifice to maintain the integrity of the Spanish sovereign nation-state.

Chapter summary

In this chapter I have discussed how different groups experience the border that separates Melilla from Morocco, and how their subjection to the border is influenced by their documented or bodily identity, or a combination of the two. I have also presented how Melilla is perceived from a Moroccan side. The Moroccan state has an ambivalent and paradoxical relationship to Melilla, as they try to grasp the city with one hand, claiming it to be part of Moroccan sovereign territory, while defending it against irregular migration with the other hand. By analyzing in which way various groups use the border, and why they cross, it is possible to say something about the status of Melilla, and the way crossing the border is experienced differently depending on who is crossing, and from which side. The Spanish hiking group could freely roam around in the Rif Mountains, and could trespass the extension of their day visas, which is limited to the Nador province. This was seemingly unproblematic, and as the driver ensured those in his car, it is allowed as long as they went back before night. As they traveled with documentation, they brought with them their political bios, as Spanish citizens, across the border.

For the Moroccan day laborers and recreational users of Melilla, the city offers opportunities. The recreational users of Melilla come to enjoy certain facilities, including libraries and cultural events, but also things that are generally not socially acceptable in Morocco, such as drinking alcohol and sleeping with prostitutes (the latter is of course not really socially acceptable in Spain either). Porteadoras and day laborers come to Melilla because it is possible to find work. Both earn meager salaries relative to those who stay in Melilla, but the border does create a place where it is possible to earn some money. Moroccans with day visas are not able to venture further into Spain, as their day visas is limited to the city, and crossing further into Spain requires additional visas or documentation, and such documentation must be shown at the port. Documentation is a

problem for the migrants in Melilla, who often leave their documentation behind as it could hinder rather than help them obtaining the right to stay in Melilla. As an exception in the Schengen agreement, entering Melilla is not equivalent to entering Europe. One migrant summed up the sentiments of many migrants, as he said “we want to go to Europe, our dream is there. Not here!”.

Migrants who enter Melilla all have to cross the same border, but both the extension and the way this is done varies depending on the groups who cross.

Chapter 4. Spain at the margins

National identity is not only something which is thought to be natural to possess, but also something natural to remember.

(Billig, 1995, p. 37)

Journalist and local historian Constantino Domínguez Sánchez, who worked in the newspaper *El Telegrama*, wrote that Melilla is not just part of Spain, but is Spain in every manner, “por su historia, por su tradición, por su vida y por sus costumbres, y principalmente por su sentimiento y corazón del españolismo que lleva en sí”²³ (Sánchez, 2004, p. 84). The conquest of Melilla in 1497 was done to secure the Iberian Peninsula from attacks from the North African coast, and stop Berber pirates from raiding the eastern coast of Spain (Sánchez, 2004, p. 64). This original goal of securing the peninsula against foreign invasion has been “successful”, as there have been no attempts from Morocco, or people from the area known as Morocco, to capture the peninsula since 1497. In the end of the 15th century, Spain redefined itself as a conquered nation, and became conquerers themselves. Spanish conquest of the Americas started after the initial “discovery” in 1492 by Christopher Columbus, and for the first 400 years, Spanish presence in Melilla was more defined by its expansion into the Moroccan hinterlands than defense of the peninsula. This is evident through the fact that wars fought between different groups from what is now Morocco and Spain post Al-Andalus have taken place on North African soil (if one disregards Francisco Franco's use of Moroccan soldiers (Regulares) in the Spanish Civil War). Melilla is situated on the extreme margins of Spain, and has been incorporated into this imagined community through various historical events. The city's role as a military outpost is now more or less completely diminished, and Jamie Trinidad argues that it is now kept for reasons of national pride, and the simple fact that the inhabitants of Melilla wish to keep living in Melilla (2012, p. 971).

In this chapter I will see in which way Spaniard inhabitants of Melilla perform their national identity to incorporate themselves into the imagined community that is the Spanish nation. This, I will argue, is largely done through turning their back against Morocco, and focus their attention across the Alboran Sea, towards the Iberian Peninsula.

23 “for its history, tradition, life, customs, and most importantly, for the feeling and heart for Spain that is here”.
Translation by author.

Historical events are also reinterpreted to manifest the Spanishness of the city, something which I will return to towards the end of this chapter.

Everyday life in Melilla, and one evening

There is a 50 kilometers per hour speed limit for all vehicles in Melilla. The speed limit is a good metaphor of everyday life in Melilla, as it goes fast enough, but usually not any faster. Melilla is much like any other Spanish city, as people go to work during the week and stay with friends and family during the weekend. Sara, a Spanish girl who had grown up in a country further south in Africa, noted that life is a bit slower in Melilla than at the peninsula. The pace of life was one of the things she enjoyed about Melilla, as the city offered the facilities of Spain combined with the “tranquilidad” of Africa. Except from the siesta, the notion of time appeared to be quite relative, and being invited to paella at the fortress at two in the afternoon usually meant dinner would be served around four. Setting up meetings was often difficult, and the stereotypical “mañana mañana” was a regular excuse to postpone. Daily life does not much concern the majority of the subjects discussed in this dissertation, and although migrants scaling the fence, relations between Spanish Muslims and Spaniards, and illegal Moroccan migrants are regular conversation topics, it has largely become naturalized as a part of everyday life. An example of the naturalization of difference in Melilla can be seen through the relationship between Melillans and a modern type of gatherer, mostly Moroccan men from the surrounding cities, who spend their days sitting by the dumpsters around Melilla. Their presence goes unchallenged, and there is an unsaid agreement between Melillans and pickers from Morocco, as five liter water cans²⁴ and other goods that might be reused are left on the side of the dumpsters in order to be picked up. Earlier, the area which is now a golf course was used as a garbage dump, but this has now been replaced by a garbage burning facility close to the Catholic graveyard. The pickers from Morocco are the main recycling entrepreneurs in Melilla.

The main ethnic divide in Melilla is between the Spaniards and the Spanish Muslims. The Spaniards in Melilla can largely be separated into two groups. Those who have grown up in Melilla, and people who have come to Melilla from the peninsula to work. Both groups of Spaniards regularly joke about Melilla being in Africa, and Melillan born Spaniards used to

24 These cans later reappear in Morocco, filled with gasoline smuggled from Algeria. These are sold at unlicensed petrol stations.

state that they were really Africans. The Rif area of Morocco, in which Melilla is situated, is famous for their production of hashish, and smoking is a quite popular activity amongst young adults in the city. The hashish is brought over the border by smugglers. One of my informants, Felix, had lived his whole life in Melilla. When he was a boy, he had often unintentionally crossed the border into Morocco while playing with his friends. At the time, the separation between Morocco and Melilla was only marked by a low fence. Felix was in his late thirties, and when not working in education, he spent time with his family, and a group of friends who also had grown up in Melilla. Like the majority of his friends, he seldom went to Morocco, and preferred to go to the peninsula whenever he had time. Today, Melilla is “online”, and receives television broadcasts from the peninsula. This ensures real time updates from Spain, and the physical distance from the mainland is shortened through satellites. The distance from the mainland is nevertheless still felt. During my stay in Melilla, Felix had some medical issues, and as the medical facilities in Melilla only offer a limited range of services, he had to go to Málaga for surgery. People in Melilla receive special rates on fares to the mainland, but are reminded of the peripheral position of the city, as ferries and planes are often canceled due to difficult weather conditions.

Felix and his friends would meet in a local tapas bar every Friday, which I will call “The Office”. Because of the working hours and the siesta, it is often hard to find time to meet during the week, but on Fridays, the group of men, sometimes accompanied by their girlfriends and wives, met up from around four o'clock. At the bar the men would tell personal anecdotes from the week that had passed, in addition to discussing national politics and Spanish television shows, all while eating tapas. Consuming tapas is a famous tradition in Spain, and is a peculiar way of consuming food that takes some time getting used to. Not before I had stayed in Melilla for a couple of months did I get used to the particular way of only eating small dishes accompanied by small glasses of beer, known as cañas. In Melilla, there was a particular pride associated with their tapas, as it was organized in a special way that differs from most tapas places in the peninsula. Rather than receiving a random tapa with their drinks, it is possible to choose which tapa one wishes to have when ordering a drink, something that can lead to much confusion for an outsider. “The Office” was owned by a man named Juan, and Felix and his friends had been regular

customers at the bar for more than ten years. This had created a special relationship between the owner and his customers, and as the hours went by, it was hard to tell who the barkeeper was and who was the customer, as the men would get behind the counter to pour their own drinks. Payment at “The Office” was based on an honorary system, and the customers were expected to keep count of their own tab. In addition to being a bar, “The Office” served as a place for the men to meet, and the inclusive atmosphere amongst the regular customers was mutually exclusive towards outsiders. “The Office” and other bars in Melilla are frequented by sellers from Morocco who stop by carrying trays of nuts. These sellers are seen throughout the city center, and are part of the city's informal economy. Unlike sellers of watches and sunglasses, whom also roam around the city to sell their goods, the nut sellers are not seen as disturbing to the customers, but are rather welcomed. Around six in the evening, Felix and his friends would leave the semi-private confines of “The Office” to go towards the port area of Melilla, where a number of bars are located. Despite the generally short distances between places in Melilla, most people prefer to travel by car, and having had a few drinks (or some more) is seldom seen as an issue. At the port, parking is often limited. Self-appointed parking guards, either migrants from the CETI or Moroccans, are there to assist in exchange for some euros. In most of these bars, it is possible to sing karaoke, which is a fascinatingly popular activity in the early evening. Spaniards are not really known as brilliant speakers of other languages than Spanish, and the majority of the songs sung were either Spanish classics or Spanish versions of English songs. Some classics and modern classics were repeatedly played, and songs about lost love were performed with passion, disregarding the vocal abilities of the performer.

I interpret these evenings as a type of informal nationalism. In similar ways to the way Eriksen argued that the international sports event in Mauritius evoked national sentiments, eating tapas and singing Spanish karaoke songs served as a way to unify people in Melilla, and remind them of their Spanishness. Micheal Billig differs between hot and banal nationalism. “Only the waved or saluted flag tends to be noticed” (1995, p. 43), he argues, and counters Anthony Giddens' previous view of seeing nationalism as an exception to everyday life. Seeing nationalism as a disruption of everyday life, or as “the exception, rather than the rule” (Billig, 1995, p. 44), does not explain how and why everyday life is infused with various forms of acting out national identity. What Giddens' is concerned with,

Billig further argues, is exclusively a type of hot nationalism, provoked by social disruption (1995, p. 44). Hot nationalism is defined by the way its performance provoke a predefined pattern of national sentiments, such as national holidays. Rather than being at the center of national sentiment, Billig terms these days as “conventional carnivals as of surplus emotion, for the participants are expected to have special feelings, whether of joy, sorrow or inebriation” (1995, p. 45). Rather than the waved and saluted, Billig suggests the unwaved flag as a metaphor of everyday nationalism, as they serve as “banal reminders of nationhood: they are 'flagging' it unflaggingly” (1995, p. 41). In Melilla, the evenings of karaoke and tapas seemed to serve as banal and casual reminders of national identity. There has been a double neglect of banal nationalism, Billig argues, as it in addition to a nation's citizens “involves academics forgetting what is routinely forgotten” (1995, p. 49). While in the field, I quickly got accustomed to certain features of the performance of national identity, but I was also quickly reminded of my status as an outsider as soon as old Spanish songs started playing, and everyone but me knew the lyrics.

A note on (Spanish) nationalism

Xosé-Manoel Núñez argues that “Spanish nationalism is [seen] as a virtually non-existent phenomenon, dissolved at the end of Francoism and the birth of the democratic monarchy established by the 1978 constitution” (Núñez, 2001, p. 719). Under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, Spanish nationalism was shaped as national-Catholicism, and fractional ethnic communities such as the Basque and Catalans were forcefully included through single language policies (Núñez, 2001, pp. 720-721). Francoist nationalism was identified by its top-down character, and is an example of Anderson's official nationalism, as the premise of what it meant to Spanish was defined by the regime. After the death of Franco in 1975, the state enforced nationalism of the dictatorship was abandoned, and the new constitution separated Spain into 50 autonomous communities (Núñez, 2001, p. 722). Despite the apparent fragmentation of the nation-state through the newly established autonomous communities, the constitution maintained that Spain was to be seen as “indivisible unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards” (Núñez, 2001, p. 723). In which way was Spain supposed to perceive themselves in the post-Franco era? Spanish nationalism post-Franco can largely be divided in two, both related to the interpretation of Spanish history (Núñez, 2001, p. 727). As I

argued in chapter one, there are two main interpretations of Spanish history. Núñez argues that there has been a tendency for intellectuals close to the Christian conservative Partido Popular (PP) to interpret the “reconquista” of Spain from the Muslim kingdoms (Al Andalus) as the historical foundation of Spain (Núñez, 2001, p. 729). Spain as a nation is thus based on its Catholic heritage (Núñez, 2001, p. 728). On the left side of the political spectrum, Núñez argues that there have been a tendency to see Spain as a multicultural nation, united through its diversity (2001, p. 736). In conclusion, Núñez notes that it is impossible to speak of “one nationalism in Spain, but *several* Spanish nationalist discourses” (Núñez, 2001, p. 743).

Despite conflicting nationalist discourses, Spaniards continue to be Spaniards. What this entails might differ depending on who one asks, both in Spain and elsewhere. Further considerations needs to be taken into account to understand nationalism and the performance of national identity. Eriksen sees nationalism as “a dual phenomenon with its crucial loci in the formal state organization and in the informal civil society” (1993, p. 1-2). As a dual phenomena, Eriksen notes that the separation between the informal and formal is not a dichotomy of the authentic and inauthentic, as they work in a dynamic (1993, pp. 18-19). Different aspects are attributed to the two types of nationalism, for example state contra civil society, rules contra improvisation, and despite a seemingly contradictory relationship between the pairings, “everybody has to relate situationally to both sets of values” (Eriksen, 1993, p. 19). Simply put, a person’s formal citizenship is influential to his or hers informal citizenship. Although not referencing Eriksen, Aihwa Ong has come to a similar conclusion on the relationship between the formal and informal, and has suggested the term cultural citizenship to

refer to the cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory. Cultural citizenship is a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society.

(1996, p. 738).

Informal citizenship is connected to informal nationalism, and hence social bios, through the way it is performed on an unregulated arena, although being influenced by formal

nationalism and citizenship. Eriksen uses the international sports as an example of how informal nationalism is expressed, and describes in which way Mauritius united during an international sports festival in 1968 (Eriksen, 1993, p. 9). The sports festival managed to achieve a degree of unity that exceeded from what was accomplished through processes of formal nationalism, although working in in a dynamic with formal nationalism (Eriksen, 1993, p. 10). Formal citizenship, as defined through being a citizen of a state, created a connection between the citizens, and as it was the national team who won in the international sports event, all citizens could all take part in celebrating the nation's victory over another nation. Núñez argues that nationalism in Spain follows similar dynamics, as identification with formal symbols and nationalism, such as the flag and national anthem, is less efficient in uniting the people than international sports events, such as a when a national team is successful (especially football!²⁵) (Núñez, 2001, p. 743).

The different perspectives on what has been influential to Spanish nationalism are transferable to Melilla, and the focus on whether the city is mainly influenced by a Spanish Catholic heritage or if it is a mixture of influences seem to shift according to context. Rather than choosing one interpretation of history, the different interpretations operate in a dynamic which is performed through various acts of formal and informal nationalistic practices. The peripheral location, and in a national context, strange demographic situation, has shaped the official way the city presents itself. In a guide from the local tourist office, called “A world in itself”, Melilla is advertised as the place that “brings together the mystery of Africa and the history of Spain”. Melilla's official representation of itself is as a place of “convivencia”, as four different cultures co-exist peacefully. Through the tourist pamphlet, a contradictory image appears, as the four cultures who reside within despite everyday contact, persist to maintain their different identities.

Annually, there is a ceremony in Melilla to celebrate the Spanish nation through honoring the flag, the “jura de bandera”. In 2015, attendees at the ceremony posted pictures of themselves kissing the flag on social media, frequently with captions such as “Viva España!”. Driessen analyzed the ceremony, and argues that it in addition to celebrating Spain, it serves as an occasion to celebrate Spaniard ethnic hegemony in Melilla (1992, pp. 112-113). During his fieldwork, the ceremony started off with a mass in a local church, and

25 Even the customers at “The Office”, who in general did not watch sports, enjoyed watching the Spanish football team during the World and Euro cup.

was an official holiday for the Spanish Catholics (Spaniards), but not for the Muslim population (Driessen, 1992, p. 115). The “jura de bandera” is a ceremony all over Spain, but in Melilla, the celebration also worked as homage to those who died defending Melilla against Rifian rebels in addition to celebrating the flag and the nation (Driessen, 1992, p. 114). The kissing of the flag serve as an explicit oath to the state, and a newspaper article explained the way

a flag kissed with the profound emotion and sacred unction by all those who swear an oath of allegiance, testifying with this act that they will defend it, if necessary, by shedding their blood to the last drop.

(Driessen, 1992, p. 114).

Flags are omnipresent in Melilla, but are largely unnoticed in everyday life. Today, the Spanish flag is accompanied by the Melilla city flag and the EU flag on most government buildings. This is an important change from the time of Driessen's fieldwork, as Spain joined the EU after he did his fieldwork. In addition to Spanish national sentiments, there is now an emphasis on being a member of a larger European community. At the port of Melilla, next to the statue of Francisco Franco, there is a road sign, welcoming arrivals to Melilla, “Municipio De Europa”, a European community. The EU flag is not celebrated in the same way as the Spanish flag, but rather stands as what Billig calls a “banal reminder” (Billig, 1995, p. 41) of the city's inclusion in the wider European community. Although not celebrated, the EU flag is present throughout Melilla, especially because of the financial assistance the city receives through the European regional development fund, FEDER. Along roads, billboards advertising infrastructural projects sponsored by the EU remind Melillans that the city has support from the EU, and Spanish citizens feel a strong sense of inclusion in a wider European community. Flags often go by unnoticed and unchallenged, and one of Richard Jenkins' summarized the role of the unwaved flag, after Jenkins challenged whether or not it was strange that people in Denmark used the Danish flag on “every” occasion (Jenkins, 2007). “Is it not interesting to ask why you do it [use the flag]?” Jenkins asks, and receives the reply “No. I don't think it is interesting at all. We just do it. I would never think about it at all” (Jenkins, 2007, p. 129).

Border people

In April 2015, Spanish television hostess Paz Padilla accidentally compared Melilla and Ceuta to other foreign territories, such as Gibraltar and Buenos Aires in a gossip TV-show called “Salvame” (Palmero, 2015). The incident caused outrage amongst Melillans, who quickly organized an online petition demanding Padilla to apologize. The petition got more than 7000 signatures, and after a few days Padilla apologized to the people of Ceuta and Melilla, and acknowledged them as parts of the integral Spanish nation-state.

Norton argues that “the liminality of those on the frontier enhances the importance of metaphors of incorporation. Liminars stand on the line that defines the state. Their inclusion within is ambiguous.” (1993, p. 61). Life at the border is precarious, especially in Melilla, as it is dependent on support from the peninsula and EU. Padilla's failure to include Melilla and Ceuta in her imagined nation was hurtful because she failed to recognize the role of the people who live at the extreme margins of the state, and one comment on the online petition states how “Melilla es más española que ella”²⁶ (Change.org, 2015).

Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan argues that ethnographers who study borders do so

with the intention of narrating the experiences of people who are often comfortable with the notion that they are tied culturally to many other people in neighboring states. An anthropology of borders simultaneously explores the cultural permeability of borders, the adaptability of border people in their attempts ideologically in their efforts to construct political divides, and the rigidity of some states in their efforts to control cultural fields which transcend their borders.

(Wilson and Donnan, 1998, p. 4).

In this dissertation, I have separated the concepts borders and boundaries, although they follow similar mechanisms and work in a dynamic. I have defined borders as the edges of a geopolitical unit such as the state, while social and ethnic boundaries includes a group who follow a common set of practices and beliefs, and recognize each other as members of the same collective group. Anderson (2006 [1983]) intertwined borders and social boundaries by stating that nations are imagined communities. With the nation as an imagined

26 “Melilla is more Spanish than her (Paz Padilla)”. Translation by author.

community, the border and the perceived unity within (social boundary) work in a dialectic. The border is reinforced by a sense of unity inside, whilst the sense of unity inside makes the importance of maintaining a border to exclude the outside more pertinent. Those who inhabit the border might, as Wilson and Donnan argues above, be comfortable with the notion that they are culturally tied to the people living in the neighboring state(s). Or they might turn to measures of actively construct political and ideological divides between themselves and people living in neighboring states. In both instances, people who live in border regions need to relate with those on the opposite side of the border. Both these assumptions take into account that the border is not a specific location where two things become different from each other, and as such, the concept of the frontier needs to be included. Frontiers are areas that “stretch across and away from borders, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviors and meanings associated with their membership in nations and states” (Wilson and Donnan, 1998, p. 9). The border is defined by both sides, and at times, differences might be exaggerated by the mere existence of the border. Peter Sahlins examines how the legal separation of the Pyrenees created two ways of being Catalan, and “the construction of French and Spanish citizenship in the borderland was intimately linked to the emergence of the national territorial boundary and territorial sovereignty after the seventeenth century” (1998, pp. 33-34). In the Pyrenees, the creation of an international border split communities who earlier had several commonalities, notably a common language and ethnicity, that differed from both Spanish and French, in two (Sahlins, 1998, p. 33). The influence of national identity strengthened throughout the years, and in an account from the 1800s, the English travel writer Richard Ford notes that “the [Spaniard's] hatred for the Frenchman... seems to increase in intensity in proportion to vicinity” (Sahlins, 1998, p. 55). Lamont and Mòlnar argues that the new boundary in the Pyrenees was not merely state imposed, but that “village communities also made use of the nation and its boundaries in pursuit of local interests” (2002, p. 183). The separation was hence a result of a dialectic between the newly imposed geopolitical border and local social boundaries. In later years, there are several implications to the identity of Spanish Catalan's in the Pyrenees, most notably their claims for independence from Spain, but for now it is sufficient to note that national identity took the place of regional identity after the separation of the area between France and Spain.

Wilson and Donnan's dual perspective on the border, as both a place of cultural permeability and a place where political difference is constantly negotiated, is useful. The potential of cultural permeability has a potential of undermining the imagined community of a nation, as influences that have been constructed as foreign becomes present in everyday life. Melilla is not just situated between two nations, but within another nation-state and disembedded from the nation-state to which it legally, and largely culturally, belongs. Both from a Spanish and a Moroccan point of view, the city is seen as a matter out of place. Borders are the edges of the state, and places (cities, towns etc.) along the border are ambiguous places due to the risk of "infection". Today, the risk of pollution might be exemplified by radio waves from cell phone networks, which do not stop at the border, but rather transcend into the foreign nation-state. When spending time in areas along the border, there is a constant "risk" of connecting to a foreign network, resulting in additional costs for the user. Awareness is necessary to avoid unintentionally connecting to the foreign network, and similarly, maintaining national identity at the border requires various acts of purification, to avoid the risk of pollution. Dirt, in Mary Douglas view, is essentially disorder, and to maintain order, it needs to be kept at bay (1966, pp. 2-3). As with Agamben's categorical pair of zoe and bios, dirt and disorder is essential for to order, but is included as a negative definition. Cultural permeability is dealt with differently at different borders, and absolute neglect and ignorance towards the other side is rarely the case. Still, interactions between border people often follow a distinctive pattern.

In Melilla, the border is both a physical and symbolic separation of two worlds. This was expressed by a British informant whom had stayed in Melilla for many years. One warm summer evening, as we were gazing across the fence and into Morocco he said "Isn't Morocco dangerous? It seems to me as if it is really chaotic. I never really go to Morocco. I'd rather head for Málaga or something".

Turning their backs against Morocco

Moroccan independence in 1956 was a turning point for Melilla's position as a Spanish city in Morocco, and is arguably the point when the Spanish policy turned from expansion into Morocco towards Spanish integration. For a long time, the city's strategic military position led Spanish men into the Moroccan hinterlands, but this has drastically changed. "I have only been to Morocco once. When I moved her seven years ago, I went to Beni Ansar to buy

furniture. It was really cheap. But for me, it was enough, Morocco is different”. Emmanuel worked in the army, and had been sent to Melilla to work some years ago. Morocco does not pose a military threat against Melilla, and this is perhaps more than anything illustrated through the fact that it is the Guardia Civil who guard the outer rims against foreign invasion, rather than the military. The threat is civilian, and has taken the form of migrants and cultural permeability. From its initial conquest in 1497 and until 1956, the military in Melilla was used to both defend the city, and to expand into the Moroccan hinterlands. Soldiers in Melilla today are not sent into Morocco, as this would be an act of war, but rather back to the mainland to participate in domestic military exercises, or abroad to regions where the Spanish military participate in international operations. The function of Melilla as a military fortress has irreversibly changed.

The Spanish – Moroccan border in Melilla is nevertheless intimidating, due to the perceived and actual cultural differences between Spain and Morocco. It is no longer foreign aggression that is feared, but cultural difference. The perceived difference between Morocco and Spain amongst Spaniards in Melilla is surprising, as several neighborhoods inside Melilla, such as the area known as El Rastro in immediate proximity to the city center look like streets in Morocco, and is mainly used by Rifians. El Rastro hosts the main mosque in Melilla, and vendors of fruits and fish occupy the streets during day time. Over time, it becomes apparent that neighborhoods such as El Rastro is not frequented by most Spaniards, and many do in fact discourage going to certain neighborhoods in Melilla. The way Spaniards avoid certain areas of the city, and Morocco itself, appears to be an important strategy in maintaining an image of Melilla as a Spanish city. In addition to being a border city, Melilla is internally divided. The majority of people who live in Melilla are Spanish citizens, but parts of the population are not perceived as Spanish enough. Gellner defined two men to belong to the same nation “if and only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation” (Gellner, 1990 [1983], p. 7). This definition must be applied with reservation, and in context. Spaniards in Melilla do recognize Spanish Muslims in Melilla as citizens of Spain (political bios), but some question their Spanishness, and brings into question their informal citizenship (social bios). This was articulated by one of my Spaniard informants, whom summarized the relationship between Spanish Muslims and Spaniards by saying “Somos iguales, entre iguales” – “we are equal, among equals”.

Applying the categorical pair of bios and zoe clarifies the difference. Spaniards and Spanish Muslims are both legal citizens in Melilla, and are hence political bios, as legal citizens of the Spanish state. The problem of the Spanish Muslims, from a Spaniard point of view, is that their informal citizenship, or social bios, are more like that of the Moroccans than the Spaniards (and hence, they are social zoe in Melilla). Spanish identity has, as Flesler points out, been constructed with the image of the “Moor” as the Other (2008, p. 195). The “Moor” is hence the social zoe to the Spanish social bios, included through their exclusion. “While insisting on the problem of the Moor, *Morisco*, or Moroccan difference, Spaniards are in fact attempting to reassure themselves of the existence of that difference: the problem is not that they are different, but that *they are not different enough*” (Flesler, 2008, p. 196). It is naive to suppose that there is no difference between Spanish Muslims (and Moroccans) and Spaniards in Melilla. However, it is not the matter at hand, and Flesler's statement of how the Moroccans (or in the case of Melilla, Spanish Muslims) are not different enough directs the attention to the way difference is articulated. One evening in Melilla, while driving through the city, one of my Spaniard informants suddenly stated that he did not like Muslims. “Why do you not like Muslims?”, “I just don't”. The perceptions of Muslims, including Spanish Muslims, as different are undoubtedly influenced by recent events by violent extremists and terrorist organizations performing atrocities in the name of Allah. Within Melilla, there have been multiple arrests of Muslim residents who sympathize with organizations such as Daesh (IS), and this seems to have influenced the reconstruction of the “moor” as dangerous anomalies. Spaniards are aware of the fact that most Muslims are not jihadists, but it is reported that a majority of jihadists arrested in Spain come from Melilla and Ceuta (Pérez and Rodríguez, 2015). In 2015, one of the men who were arrested for running a “jihadi-bride” recruitment operation out of Melilla turned out to be an ex-soldier in Spanish Army (Dolz, 2015). The perceived difference between Spaniards and Muslims is however not only based on fears of jihadis and cultural permeability.

Alicia, a woman in her thirties working in the army, most explicitly expressed her thoughts on the differences between Moroccans, including Rifians, and Spaniards. After meeting her the first time, she said she had useful information for my project. She had arrived to Melilla with the same naiveté as other Peninsulars, she said, and frowned upon the racist attitudes she had encountered amongst some of the locals. Later, she claimed to have found the

truth. Alicia had met the father of her child during a trip to the south of Morocco, and she often emphasized that the Amazigh of the south were considered the most handsome men in Morocco. Her affection towards the Amazigh of the south had changed, as the father of her child had turned out to be another man than the one she had fallen in love with. She did however still have an interest in the Amazigh, and separated between three Amazigh groups in Morocco. These were the Atlas Amazigh, the nomads of the Sahara, and the Rifians (rifeños) of the region we were staying. “According to the real Moroccans, the Rifians are the bad people of Morocco”. Moreover, she said the Rifians were known for treating their women badly and spending their days drinking while their wives stayed home and worked. Melilla was different than peninsular Spain because of the Rifians according to her, and this could be seen at the beaches in Melilla, which were a lot dirtier than those in the peninsula because “they [Rifians] throw their garbage in the ocean”. She explained that Moroccan men in general only think about sex, something which was also the case for Spaniards in the south of Spain. She suspected that this had to do with blood, and that the blood of Spanish men in the south of Spain had been mixed with that of Moroccan men throughout the years.

Maintaining both the political border and the social boundary in Melilla requires a lot of work, and in the former case, money. Some of the peninsular Spaniards whom had come to Melilla to work were skeptical about maintaining Spanish cities in Morocco, especially in the context of the recent economic crises. “Melilla is not Spain, Spain is different”, they would often say. The majority of peninsulars working in Melilla, as a type of domestic expatriates, intended to leave the city when they got new jobs. One of those who were about to leave, Sandra, had lived and worked in Melilla for five years. Sandra did not think Melilla was a part of the “proper” Spain, and that keeping the cities, and the small islands off the Moroccan coast, was an unnecessary expense for a country hit by an economic crisis. It would be better to give the territories back to Morocco, she said.

Franco is dead, long live Franco

Can the statue of a man who has passed away speak? Of course not. Nevertheless it might be able to tell us something. The statue of Francisco Franco was erected two years after his death in 1975, and is a homage to the leader of La Legión in Melilla. Franco launched his coup from Ceuta and Melilla (Hite, 2008, p. 116), but this goes unsaid in Melilla. Francisco

Franco's rise to power in did in many ways start in Melilla and Morocco, and there is a certain poetic beauty that Melilla has become his final “resting place”.



Illustration 4: Statue of Francisco Franco at the port of Melilla. Photo by author

Spain under Franco's leadership was however, as he put it in his victory speech after the Spanish Civil war (1936-1939), a totalitarian state. It has been estimated that at least 300,000 were killed during the Civil War, and that some 440,000 Republicans went into exile (Davis, 2005, p. 860). Furthermore it has been estimated that some 400,000 spent time in prisons and labor camps during his regime (Davis, 2005, p. 860). After Franco's death in 1975, numerous mass graves have been uncovered, containing the remains of people who disappeared during the Francoist dictatorship (Davis, 2005, p. 860-861). Davis argues that Franco's dictatorship is comparable to the dictatorships in Chile and Argentina, but that Spain differs from the former in the manner they handled the aftermath (2005, p. 862). Rather than confronting those whom committed crimes during the dictatorship, “The Law of Amnesty” from 1977 secured the release of political prisoners and “contained

articles preventing the persecution of Francoist repressors” (Davis, 2005, p. 863). In addition to the judicial amnesty law, it has been said that an informal pact of forgetting, Pacto del Olvido, was established in Spain, as a form of collective amnesia (Davis, 2005, p. 863-864). In 2007, the “Ley de la Memoria Histórica”, was passed. Article 15 stated that public administrations should take the appropriate actions to remove plaques, shields and other commemorative objects or references from the military uprising, Civil War and the dictatorship. There are however a number of statues and plaques left in Melilla that were erected to celebrate fascist Spain, and a street in the city center is still named after an important fascist ideologist, José Antonio Primo de Rivera.

José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of Miguel Primo de Rivera, dictator in Spain from 1923-1930, was killed during the Spanish Civil War²⁷. His remains, and Franco's, are buried in an other controversial remainder of Francoist Spain, The Valley of the Fallen outside Madrid (Hite, 2008, p. 111). The Valley of the Fallen is a huge monument constructed during Franco's reign to honor those who died during the Spanish Civil War, and contains approximately 40,000 Spanish citizens who died during the war (Hite, 2008, p. 111). On the inauguration of the Valley of the Fallen, Franco compared those who died during the civil war to Christian martyrs, sacrificed for the nation, and furthermore that it was the responsibility of the survivors to “keep guard of what they died for” (Crumbaugh, 2011, p. 422). To connect the Valley with the nation, Crumbaugh offers an Agambian explanation. “Is it ever possible”, he asks, “to memorialize political victims without producing idealized yet disembodied *bios* such as the *caídos* [fallen] and politically unintelligible *zoe*, of which the prisoners at the Cuelgamuros labor camps are only an extreme example?” (2011, p. 432). The Valley of the Fallen was constructed with manpower (mostly political prisoners) from the Cuelgamuros labor camp, and it has been estimated that between 14 and a couple of thousand died during (or after as a consequence of working on) the construction of the Valley of the Fallen (Crumbaugh, 2011, p. 426). Crumbaugh's question of whether or not it is possible to remember political victims without producing categories of *bios* and *zoe* is interesting, and he does not really seem to answer his own question. The answer is likely to be no, as war monuments commemorating people who have fallen in defense of a nation-state requires an opposition, a *zoe*. Still, the Valley of the Fallen stands carved in stone.

²⁷ The date of his death, November 20, (20-N) was celebrated as a national holiday during Franco's regime (Aguilar and Humlebæk, 2002, p. 128). Francisco Franco also died on November 20, 1975.

The prevailing existence of Francoist symbols in Melilla has been made possible through creative reinterpretations of history. One of my informants said the statue at the port commemorates Francisco Franco's efforts during the Rifian war, rather than his years as a dictator. Jaume Castan Pinos made the similar findings, and argues that “a considerable majority of the enclave dwellers do not see Franco as a fascist dictator but as a liberator of the city...” (Pinos, 2009, pp. 72-73).

There are two main reasons that the statue of Franco is problematic. The first is the most obvious, as he was a dictator. The second, and perhaps more important in local context, is not just related to the statue itself, but the reinterpretation of its meaning. When the last statue of Franco in mainland Spain was taken down in Santander in 2008, a handful of Franco supporters showed up with flowers to honor his memory (Tremlet, 2008). The same year, in an article in the Spanish newspaper *El País*, the vice mayor of Melilla, Miguel Marín, stated that the city intended to take down the statue of Franco as well (El País, 2008). Two years later the current mayor of Melilla, Juan José Imbroda, stated that the statue is in fact not a homage to the dictator Franco, but to the military officer and the soldiers who defended the city in against Abd el-Krim and the Rifians in the 1920s (Magaldi, 2010). As the author of the article phrases it, “the last statue of Franco refuses to die”. The same year, in 2010, Marín stated that the statue had been offered to the military, and that the statue would be perfect in the Military Museum in Melilla²⁸, which is a five minute walk from its current location (Larazon.es, 2010). Marín had not received a response, and maintained that the statue was not in disagreement with the memory law, as it was not in honor of the dictator Franco, but of the man that saved the city from Rifian forces in 1921 (Larazon.es, 2010). Following the statements by Imbroda and Marín, Franco stands at the port because he protected the population of Melilla from Rifian forces under the leadership of Abd el-Krim. The reinterpretation of what the statue actually make a new, or renewed, connection between the statue in Melilla and the Valley of the Fallen. Franco as a representative for those who died in Melilla makes the statue a kind of “tomb for the unknown soldier”, coincidentally in the shape of the former dictator. Whereas the Valley of the Fallen is an actual tomb, containing bodies of the dead, the statue is a representation of those who died. Franco's statue follows a strange trajectory in comparison with other war

28 The Military Musuem already contains a plaque where Franco announces the end of the Civil War. His role as a dictator is however not problematized.

monuments. Historian Ken S. Inglis states that war monuments for a long time were reserved for commemorated leaders, and that soldiers who died were buried in nameless mass graves, “mere compost for the causes they have willingly or unwillingly served” (1993, p. 9). In the late 20th century, the unknown fallen became recognized, and tombs were erected to honor those who died (both with and without corpses) (Inglis, 1993, p. 9). In the Valley of the Fallen, there have been attempts to re-present the crypt as an homage to all those who died during the Civil War, regardless of political affinity, although it is recognized that the majority of those buried were Nationalists, fighting (and dying, willingly or unwillingly) for Franco (Hite, 2008, p. 116-117). Both the Valley of the Fallen and the statue of Franco at the port of Melilla have undergone a reinterpretation, as they are now seen as sites of memory for the soldiers who died rather than tributes to Franco and fascist Spain.

It would be wrong to say that the statue is unanimously seen as unproblematic, and many Melillans are critical to having the old dictator standing as the welcome committee for those who arrive to Melilla by boat. Moreover, the statue is often seen with a certain humorous distance, and as an example of the strange government of the city. Franco at the port is an excellent example of seeing nationalism as a process of remembering and forgetting. It also surfaces different views of nationalism in the peninsula and in Melilla, and the reinterpretation makes it a symbol of a kind of local nationalism. There is a strong emphasis on being Melillense in Melilla, as a form of non-judicial local citizenship. Turning the statue into a commemoration of those who fell to defend Melilla from foreign invasion takes a strange turn today, as it was the ancestors of a large portion of Melilla's residents, the Spanish Rifian Muslims, who were the enemy. Tariq, whom will return in chapter 5, stated that Melilla is a conservative city, leading him to state how many in Melilla are “más papista que el papa”, in the way they exaggerated their Spanishness to compensate for their distance to the mainland. There is no lack of other statues commemorating soldiers who have died to defend Spain and the city in Melilla, and as such, the reason for keeping the statue seems dubious. Billig's separation of the waved and the unwaved is applicable to the statue, and the statue's presence does in a way flag Spanish and Melillan identity and history “unflaggingly”. There are no celebrations of the statue, but the connotations of having a statue of an earlier dictator makes it hard not to notice. At the very end of my

fieldwork, a picture of the border guards of the Guardia Civil reached newspapers all over Spain. The picture shows some twenty border guards posing in front of the statue in their easily recognizable black uniforms and the Spanish flag at the center. The men are seemingly content with the situation, and one guard holds up a thumb of approval. Which Franco were the guards honoring?

The border guards (GRS) of the Guardia Civil are the new defenders of the city, and work in Melilla on shifts lasting somewhere between three weeks to one month. Living in Melilla, one border guard admitted, was unbearably boring. The picture was reportedly taken on the Spain's Armed Forces Day (Anderson, 2015), and was perhaps a result of heightened national pride. The problem however, that the source of national pride the picture presented was outdated. Like the Spanish army in Morocco in the 1920s, led by amongst others the military officer Francisco Franco, the GRS of the Guardia Civil now serve as the first line of defense for the nation-state, and perhaps this prompted their initiative to be pictured.

Chapter summary

Spanish nationalism in Melilla is manifested in multiple ways, but there seem to be a prevailing tendency of constructing national identity against the image of the foreign invader, be it the “moor” or in recent years, migrants. Melilla's strategic position as a military outpost has been diminished post 1956, and if one disregards sporadic protests at the border, there are as good as no violent confrontations at the Spanish – Moroccan border. In this chapter, I have argued that Melilla has been converted from a military outpost that gazed inwards Moroccan hinterlands, to a Spanish city which is simply located outside the peninsula. This is evident through the northwards orientation of the inhabitants of the city, and that the military's function in Melilla is virtually abandoned, as it is rather the Guardia Civil, and other police forces that now protect its borders.

Melillans as border people deal with their ambiguous position through various means of distancing themselves from Morocco, and communication between Spaniards in Melilla and Moroccan day laborers follows patterned forms. Spanish nationalism in Melilla is present through both official parades and ceremonies, but the connection to the peninsula is more frequently performed through daily acts that serve as banal reminders of nationality.

Consumption and popular culture ties its citizens to Spain, and the existence of relatively recent inventions such as the internet and satellite TV-broadcasts creates a connection to the mainland in ways that were difficult before. While connecting to the mainland, I have argued that Spaniards in Melilla disconnects from its immediate surroundings. To create a distance between themselves and the surroundings many Spaniards prefer to stay in the city center, keeping foreign influences at bay.

The strange example of the statue of Francisco Franco at the port does in many ways summarize the identity politics in Melilla. In the next chapter I will present and analyze the growing Spanish Muslim population in Melilla. In this chapter, I have argued that the reinterpretation of the statue is problematic, not only because Franco was a dictator, but because the new interpretation claims the statue to represent those who died at the hands of Rifian rebels during the Rif War in the 1920s. Today, Rifians have been converted from enemy to neighbor, and the interpretation of the statue as a homage to those who died defending Melilla against the ancestors of a large part of the city is problematic. The statue serve as a reminder of a time when Spain expanded into Morocco, but is now, like many of the Spaniards in Melilla, facing across the sea and back towards the Iberian Peninsula.

Chapter 5. Spanish Muslim, Rifian, Amazigh or Moroccan?

Muslims in Melilla are usually considered as a sort of “fifth column” in the service of Morocco in the enclave, but at the same time they are qualified as “traitors” by the Moroccan state.

(Rodriguez-Martin, 2007, p. 17).

Melilla is not only a border between two nations, but a boundary (in both a geopolitical and social sense) that separates two large regions, the Muslim world and the Christian (and the Orient and the Occident). Melilla is one of the few cities in Spain that is experiencing demographic growth, and the increasing population has largely been attributed to the Spanish Muslims as a demographic group (Elcano, 2014, p. 157). A report published by a Spanish think tank express concerns over the demographic situation in Melilla, as they consider the demographic evolution in the enclave to be a “Maroccanization” of the city (Elcano, 2014, p. 157). The statement is interesting, and this chapter is an extension on earlier studies about Melilla that have proposed similar ideas (see for example Pinos, 2009, p. 71). The assumption that the Spanish Muslims of Rifian origin would favor giving the city back to Morocco does not take into account the historical relations between the people of the Rif and Arabs, and the Moroccan state. Enríquez points to a curious fact, and states how the Rifian population in Melilla is intimidating to the Moroccan government, rather than the Spanish, as “the eventual scenario of a Berber party governing in Melilla... could become the center of an autonomist movement in the Rif” (Enríquez, 2007, p. 231).

Just as Spaniards in Melilla, the identity of Spanish Muslims is affiliated with the territory in which Melilla is situated. Their territorial identity is articulated differently than that of the Spaniards, as they are frequently associated with Morocco, because their identity as Rifians is connected to the adjacent country. In this chapter, I will see the identity of Spanish Muslims in Melilla is constructed through various notions of territorial and national identity.

From temporary citizens to Spanish Muslims

For centuries, Melilla remained mono-ethnic, and Muslims were prohibited from living in the city until 1868 (Elcano, 2014, p. 156). At the time, the prohibition did not really influence the population, as the city was a military outpost. In the end of the 19th century,

Melilla was turned into a city, and the population grew rapidly from the early 1900s. The first Muslim residents moved to Melilla in between 1910 and 1930, and belonged to families which at the time were favorably treated by the Spaniards (Driessen, 1992, p. 163). One of these favorably treated families, as “*moros amigos*”, was the Khatabbi's, the family of Abd el-Krim, whom later led the rebellion against the Spanish in the Rif. According to Driessen, a second wave of migrants moved to Melilla around the year of Moroccan independence, but these were not incorporated in the same way as those belonging to the first wave, and most lived at the margins of Melilla (1992, p. 163). The margins of Melilla are recognizably different from the center through architecture, and many of the houses in the hills surrounding Melilla bear strong resemblance to the squared red brick houses that can be seen across border. In the early 1980s, when Driessen conducted his fieldwork, most Muslims lived in the margins, and he estimated that some 7000 people lived in margin “ghettos” at the time (1992, p. 163). Until 1986, the majority of Muslims in Melilla lived there without being fully incorporated into the Spanish state, and were only partly included through a statistical card that categorized them as temporary citizens of Melilla (Enríquez, 2007, p. 220). In 1985, the Spanish government passed a new law on foreign citizen, or “Aliens”. The contents of the law was two sided, as the process of getting a Spanish citizenship for countries with historical relations to Spain were simplified (Enríquez, 2007, p. 220), while also accelerating the process of expelling foreigners (Driessen, 1992, p. 171). Morocco was conveniently left out of the list of countries with cultural and historical ties to Spain, despite the almost 1300 year long relationship between the two countries (Enríquez, 2007, p. 220). Ethnic tensions within Melilla rose as a consequence, and the law was welcomed by the Catholic Spaniards, whom already at the time had started to feel the pressure of Rifian migration to Melilla (Driessen, 1992, p. 171). Catholic Spaniards organized a demonstration, in which reportedly about 25,000 participated, asking to accelerate the application of the law (Driessen, 1992, p. 172). The law would challenge their monopoly of defining what it meant to be Spanish. Every action has a reaction, and the Muslim residents, a majority of whom had spent their whole lives in Melilla, organized themselves. In January 1986, a general strike amongst the Muslims was initiated, and in March the same year, a peaceful demonstration was met with tear gas (Driessen, 1992, p. 172). Following the event, leaders from the Muslim population were able to organize a meeting with the Spanish Ministry of Interior, a meeting which caused

further outrage amongst Spanish Catholics who demonstrated with slogans stating that the Muslims in Melilla were “Morocco's Trojan horse in Melilla” (Driessen, 2007, p. 172). With the development, they feared that it was no longer the outside that was going to devour them, but that they would be engulfed from within. During the summer of 1986, a group of Spaniards gathered outside the house of a local Muslim leader, after Spain had won a football game in the Mexican World Cup, to vent their feelings towards the Muslim citizens in Melilla, yelling “Viva España”, and “Moros out!” (Driessen, 1992, p. 173). A confrontation between Muslims and Spaniards took place, but the parties were separated by the police, and Muslim leaders encouraged other Muslims not to resort to violence in the aftermath (Driessen, p. 173). In 1987, Muslims in Melilla were granted Spanish citizenship, and the majority of those who had applied for citizenship in 1986 (about 14,000 out of an estimated 17,000 total Muslim population) were naturalized as Spanish (Tarrés, 2014, p. 157; Enríquez, 2007, p. 221).

The year 1987 was a turning point for the (Spanish) Muslims in Melilla, as they were finally incorporated into the Spanish state. Their status changed from political zoe to political bios. This incorporation has similarities to the incorporation sought by the migrants at the CETI, whom like the Muslims prior to being turned into Spanish Muslims are stuck betwixt and between. Post naturalization as Spanish citizens, the Spanish Muslim community in Melilla has grown significantly. The only demographic statistical survey completed in Melilla was done in 1986, in relation to the potential naturalization of the Muslim citizens of the city. At the time, it was estimated that 32% of the total population, was of Moroccan origin. Today, the numbers varies both amongst reports and depending on whom one asks in Melilla, but generally, it is estimated that a demographic shift making the Spanish Muslim population the majority is imminent, if it has in fact not already happened. The difficulty in estimating numbers stems from the fact that the Spanish statistical institute (INE) does not include ethnicity in their numbers, and available numbers are based on surnames. The available estimates suggests there to be between 40% (Enríquez, 2007, p. 222) and 53% Spanish Muslims in Melilla (Sibai, 2010, p. 185). Population growth in Melilla is attributed to the Spanish Muslims of Melilla, and the city has experienced a 60% growth in population since 1986 (Elcano, 2014, p. 157). Spain in general has by comparison grown by 22%, and is today experiencing negative population

growth (Elcano, 2007, p. 157).

Inter-ethnic conflicts such as those in the 1980s have largely diminished in Melilla. Nevertheless, tensions between Spanish Muslims and Spaniards in Melilla prevail. The majority of Spanish Muslims in Melilla were born in the city. One of them is named Tariq. Tariq is a man in his early fifties, and identifies himself as “española Musulman”, Spanish Muslim. He owns a shop in the city center of Melilla, where he spends the majority of his week. Earlier, he worked in politics on both a local and regional level, but said that he had given up politics in order to devote himself to his god and his family. Religious practice varies amongst (Spanish) Muslims, both in Melilla and in Morocco, and Drissen notes that it is an activity mainly reserved for “middle-aged and elderly men from the upper and middle classes” (Drissen, 1992, p. 164). Without knowledge of his wealth, it is reasonable to assume that he was relatively well off, and this, he stated, allowed him to express himself freely. “There is a lot of clientelism in Melilla, and people are often afraid to say what they mean. True freedom is only possible when a man is economically independent”. Tariq was economically independent and ready to speak his mind about different things in Melilla. During the weekends, Tariq worked as a guide for participants on a local temple tour in Melilla, hosted by the local tourist agency. The purpose of the tour is to exhibit the four different cultures in Melilla, and consists of a visit to a local church, the synagogue, the small Hindu temple, which is impossible to find unless one knows its location, and finally a mosque located by the border.

In February, I joined one of these tours. After visiting the local church, synagogue and Hindu-temple, we arrived at the mosque around twelve o'clock. It was mid-February and still relatively cold. There were some 15-20 people in the group, out of which the majority were from mainland Spain. The mosque was decorated with symmetrical designs, and calligraphy from the Koran went all around the walls. Tariq welcomed the group, whom had taken off their shoes, and after the women had been equipped with head scarfs, we sat down. At the church, the priest had spoken about the history of the different artifacts within the church, presuming the congregation to have sufficient knowledge about Christianity. In the synagogue and in the temple, the hosts had spoken about different aspects of their religion, and Tariq did the same. In what seemed like an attempt to bridge the gap between Christianity and Islam and Spain and Morocco, he pointed out some

common grounds. First, he explained the role of Jesus in Islam, seemingly to the annoyance of some members of the audience whom started to make strange facial expressions. A man in his sixties made an even stranger face when Tariq pointed out how the Spanish expression *olé*, most likely had its etymological roots from Arabic, *Allah*²⁹. Furthermore, he challenged the official city policy as a place of peaceful co-habitation, *convivencia*, and noted that the situation was better described as multicultural, than intercultural, meaning that people lived together, but did not interact with each other. Tariq spoke for about an hour, and afterward, the group was served Moroccan mint tea before dissolving.

Listening to Tariq was intriguing, and some months later, I conducted an interview with him in his store. There, he explained that he did the temple tours for free, as he felt obligated to inform people about Islam. Especially, he was concerned about the connotations his religion had gotten post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and emphasized how the true Islam is practiced through both the heart and the brain. “Violent jihadism is what happens when you forget to include the brain”. After talking about Islam for a while, he gave his impressions of the city. “Melilla is a multicultural city, as there are many different cultures living peacefully side by side. But it is not intercultural, meaning that there is no intermix of the cultures”. According to Tariq, Muslims had always intermixed where ever they went, and said that a Spanish philosopher claimed Al-Andalus to be the only truly intercultural place in time. “In Spain, you have two types of historians, those seeing the cultural heritage of Spain as purely Catholic, and those acknowledging the influence of Judaism and Islam. Over time, these influences has been written out of history, and in my son's history book, only three pages are devoted to Al-Andalus”. Tariq referred to an old phrase stating that “Europe ends by the Pyrenees” to explain what he called a historical complex present in Spain. Flesler argues that this is reflected through the “Loss of Spain Legend” (2008, p. 58). Moreover, Flesler notes how challenging the supposed misery of the Spanish under Al-Andalus would be contentious because it “encompasses such emotionally charged issues as whether Spain has more in common with North Africa than Europe” (2008, p. 59). The current situation in Melilla had made Tariq into a pessimist or “an enlightened realist” as he called it, and he was not sure how the situation would change in the future, and he had largely left the future to the young Melillans.

29 Tariq later told me that Spanish has some 4000 loanwords from Arabic.

History, territory and identity

Nation-states are connected to territories, and exist within territories encapsulated by borders. Territory and the nation is a strange coupling, as the territory itself, comprised of rivers, mountains, fields and shores, do not provoke an immediate bond. There are several understandings of the relationship between people and territory. In Tim Ingold's understanding of the landscape, it is not land, nature or space (2000, p. 190). Rather, it is created by those who reside, or dwell, within the landscape, and it is thus "the world as it is known to those who dwell therein, who inhabits its places and journey along the paths connecting them" (Ingold, 2000, p. 193). In the context of a nation, a separation between space and place is useful, as the latter includes the meanings that are imposed on the land. Space, Ingold argues, is more akin to a blank sheet of paper, and is more of interest to cartographers than anthropologists, as it does not include the various meanings imposed into them by those who live within (2000, pp. 191-192). A place is formed by those who reside in them, and the significance of a place is formed by those who spend time and engage within (Ingold, 2000, p. 192). Ingold then gives an interesting insight to the concept of place when stating that places do not have boundaries, as boundaries are "not a condition for the constitution of places on either side of them; nor do they segment the landscape" (2000, p. 192). The landscape itself does not constitute a boundary, and boundaries "can only become a boundary, or the indicator of a boundary, in relation to the activities of the people (or animals) for whom it is recognized or experienced as such" (Ingold, 2000, p. 193). To summarize, a place is formed by the people who reside within it, and territory as a condition for the nation depends on having the people who stay in it as a place, filling it with meaning. The previous chapters have discussed various relations to Melilla as a place, and although different groups and people who stay within Melilla, either permanently or on a temporary basis, have different sentiments towards Melilla as a place, it is nevertheless filled with meaning. The active engagement in border and boundary maintenance further show that there is no natural boundary, or separation, between Melilla and its surroundings, but that this is formed through the activity of those who stay within and outside the city. Territory itself is insufficient to create boundaries, but these are nevertheless present. The question of territoriality, landscape and the nation (and nation-state) are significant when trying to understand the peculiar position of Spanish Muslims in

Melilla.

How does territoriality and the concept of landscape influence national identity? Peter J. Taylor argues how the feeling of belonging to a nation coincided with the feeling of territorial belonging in the 19th century (1994, p. 155-156).

As its landscape became imbued with historical significance, the community of people who had once lived there, sharing the same language, were given a glorious, if sometimes tragic, shared past which pointed the way to their common destiny.

(Taylor, 1994, p. 156)

Through creating an imagined community, those who reside within the territory were able to identify with each other, and construct their identities against those who were outside. The previous chapter took the frontier into consideration when discussing the border – boundary nexus. It was argued that Spaniards related to the frontier by turning their backs to it. Regarding the historical fluctuations of the Spanish border in Melilla, it is evident that they have turned their backs quite recently, more precisely around Moroccan independence in 1956. Today, the Spaniards in Melilla are in an intermediate position because they are surrounded by a foreign territory. They are not geographically connected to the peninsula, but nevertheless inherently Spanish, and this is also phrased through their peripheral position, as they are maintaining Spanish sovereignty in Africa. Spanish Muslims are in an intermediate position because they are surrounded by a foreign territory in which their ancestors lived for hundreds (if not thousands) of years. This has caused suspicion, and one of Enríquez informants questioned the loyalty of the Spanish Muslim population, and wondered which king they were referring to when talking about the king, the Spanish or the Moroccan (2007, p. 225). Quite indiscreetly, she was questioning whether the population really considered themselves as Spanish, or Moroccan. One interpretation of this is that Enríquez' informant considered the Spanish Muslim population in Melilla as parts of a diaspora, in the sense of a population that maintains cultural traits from their homeland while leaving abroad. Spanish Muslims in Melilla can however hardly be defined as living in a Moroccan diaspora, as an important layer of their identity is that of being Rifian, which is not necessarily included in the category of being Moroccan, nor Spanish, but relates to the geographic territorial location in which Melilla is situated. If Melilla is in fact situated in

the geographical area called the Rif, identifying as Rifian should not be equalized with national identification. In a historical context, being Rifian has implied an opposition to the Moroccan government, something which might help explain the strong emphasis of the Spanish Muslims of Melilla as being Melillense. Categorizing the group as part of a diaspora would hence be problematic, as their lives are lived in the area from which their identity as Rifians derives, but as a consequence of historical circumstances, it is a part of Spain rather than Morocco.

In the spring of 2015, local elections were held in Melilla, and national elections in December. The recent European economic depression hit Spain severely, and domestic unemployment, especially amongst young adults, increased drastically from 2008. Spanish politics were highly influenced by a new left wing party, “Podemos”, and the leader of the party, Julio Iglesias, frequented in debates on national television. As everywhere else, politics is a regular conversation topic in Melilla, and many of my informants hoped the national government would change, as the sitting government has been subject to multiple scandals, including corrupt politicians. The Spanish government is, like the Melillan, currently held by the Partido Popular (PP), and local politicians have also been accused of corruption, with several cases ending up in court. One evening, a man explained me the basics of Spanish politics, and pointed out the differences between the various parties along a usual left-right axis. “How about politics in Melilla?” I asked. “Oh, don't get me started; politics in Melilla is a whole other story”. Rather than explaining the political parties along an axis, he waved his arms to indicate how it is undecidable. “In Melilla, politics is all about religion”.

The numbers from the latest election supports his statement, as the Christian conservative Partido Popular (PP) received roughly 43% of the votes, and the Muslim dominated Coalición por Melilla (CpM) received roughly 27% of the votes. The election was characterized by turmoil, something which culminated when members from the CpM accused a member from the PP of electoral fraud, by casting false votes at the post office in Melilla. The event turned into a brawl at the post office, captured by spectators with their cell phones. In the weeks leading up to the election in May, the political parties made their presence in Melilla through billboards and advertisements, and two cars from the CpM drove around the city while playing the party's song, “Himno CpM”, through loudspeakers

attached to the roofs. The party has been accused of being overly attached to religion, something which they have partly denounced, by claiming that they are a party for all Melillans. The party logo has the letters CpM written in with both the Latin and the Tifinagh alphabet, used to write Tamazight, and the party's ethnic affiliation is characteristic. In “Himno CpM”, the singer switches between singing in Spanish and Tamazight, before switching to Arabic during the chorus, which only consists of the phrase “Incha'Allah” being said multiple times. The song is a reflexion on the party, through their identification as Spanish, Rifian and Muslim. CpM was founded in 1995, by a group who were previous members of the Spanish socialist party PSOE³⁰ (Karell, 2014, p. 152). Over the years, the most important victory of the party has been the recognition of Muslim holidays, which are now official holidays for Muslim residents in Melilla and Ceuta (Karell, 2014, p. 152). Recently, the party has fought for recognition of Tamazight as an additional official language in Melilla (López-Bueno, 2013, p. 233). There is legal precedence for this in Spain, due to the status of autonomy of its regions, and there are at least eight recognized regional languages in Spain (Llera, 2009, p. 324). The party platform includes motion to include Tamazight in schools, and in 2014, a spokesman of the party suggested that Tamazight should be introduced for all school children (El Faro, 2014). So far, a local culture institute offers courses in Tamazight, but the CpM has not been successful in incorporating the language in primary schools.

Towards the end of the election, Ali invited me to join him at the end of election rally hosted by the CpM. Ali came from Nador, and was a Moroccan Rifian man in his twenties. The end of the election was to be marked by a concert with a world famous Muslim R'n'B artist, and took place in the “Auditorium Carvajal”, an amphitheater with the capacity of approximately 4000 people in immediate proximity to the city center. The majority of the people seemed to be Spanish Muslims, and Moroccans who had crossed the border for the occasion. The venue quickly filled up with people anticipating the great “espetaculo”. Ali stated how all of the people present were Moroccans. “I thought they were Spanish”, I said. “Well yes, but Moroccan people” he replied. Ali emphasized the informal nationality of those present, and recognized them as part of Morocco due to their faith and ethnicity, and the fact that the Rif is located within Morocco. “But all the people here are Muslim, since you are Christian, you cannot really be here. Maher Zain is Muslim music!” I reminded him

30 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party).

how I had previously told him that I was a non-believer. “But, if he sings well, maybe I will be convinced!”. We both laughed, and he translated what I had told him to his friend. After an opening act, consisting of a local group with piles of self-esteem and a general lack of introspection regarding their vocal abilities, the leader of CpM entered the stage. The crowd cheered and waved their green³¹ flags enthusiastic. “Salam aleikum!” the leader yelled through his microphone. “Aleikum Salam!” the crowd responded. His speech contained the usual regards to people who had helped him and the party in the electoral process, and that the *Partido Popular* once again had showed their true colors by trying to cheat. He decided to yell his speech, either as a rhetorical device, or seemingly not aware of the magic of a microphone, and his voice cracked several times. After facing the allegations that the party mainly consisted of Muslims, he claimed they represented all people Melilla. “Somos Melillense! Somos Melillense” he yelled to support his argument. Once again the crowd got up on their feet and started yelling. “Presidente! Presidente!”. After he finished his speech, he welcomed the main act of the day, Maher Zain, to the stage. Maher Zain is a Swede with Lebanese parents, and has stated that he shifted his focus from making regular popular music to a focusing on his God. His greatest hits include songs such as “Insha Allah”, “Thank you Allah”, and my personal favorite “Assalamu Alayka”. Like the CpM, Maher Zain is influenced by a mixture of the east and the west, and include instruments such as the oud and darbuka in a more contemporary R'n'B sound.

After the concert finished, I asked Ali if he had any friends from Melilla attending the concert, as he had previously said that he had several friends in Melilla. He said that he did, but did not really say hi to anyone. Being quite active on social media, he wanted to have his picture taken with one of the leaders of CpM to post it to Facebook, but after waiting for five minutes he gave up.

Local elections surface the identity politics of Spanish Muslims in Melilla, and the CpM leader's argument that they were a party for all Melillense makes it seem as if what is encountered is a type of hybrid, or intermediate identity. What does this entail? The theoretical framework in this thesis suggests a separation between social and political zoe and bios, a categorical pair suggested by Agamben to be the “the fundamental categorical pair of Western politics” (Agamben, 1998, p. 9). The pair can work as a foundation for an

31 The color is significant, and I was persuaded to buy a green carpet by a Rifian I met in Casablanca because it was the “color of Islam”.

understanding of hybrid identity. The strong focus on being Melillense in Melilla transcends the national categories of being Moroccan and Spanish, all while not necessarily excluding them. The history of Spanish Muslims in Melilla traces their conversion from being political zoe in Melilla, into eventually receiving citizenship in the mid-eighties and thus turning into lawful citizens of the state, as political bios. The social identity (bios) of the Spanish Muslims follow a different trajectory, because the acquisition of legal citizenship did not necessarily include them as cultural citizens, or social bios. As some exclusionists might argue, holding a Spanish passport does not make you Spanish. By acquiring the categorization of being Melillense, a category Driessen noted was reserved for Spaniards with parents from Melilla in the 1980s (1992, p. 15), Spanish Muslims are able to partly bypass national and ethnic categorizations. The demographic shift in Melilla includes a shift in who has got the power to define what social bios (as defined by the dominant group) in the city means. Following Lamont and Mòlnar's definition of the social boundary, this is manifested through “patterns of social exclusion and racial segregation” (Lamont and Mòlnar, 2002, p. 169). Such discriminatory boundaries are the presumably the basis for the concerns amongst Spaniards, as the Spanish Muslims turn into a majority. This concern assumes a one-to-one relationship between ethnicity, religion and language, and identity, but as the case in Melilla shows, the Spanish Muslims in Melilla are affiliated with multiple symbolic boundaries, including that of being Spanish.

In a study on Spanish Muslim identity conducted in various cities in Spain, Salam Adlbi Sibai shows how women in their twenties adopt strategy of multiple ethnic, religious and social identities (Sibai, 2010, p. 194). The majority of the students in the study refer to themselves through a variety of combinations of categories. These categories include being Spanish, European, Rifian, from Nador, and Muslim (Sibai, 2010, p. 194). One of the students draws attention to the problem of associating religion with nationality, and the students refer to specific localities, such as the Rif or Nador, as the origins of their parents (Sibai, 2010, pp. 194-196). The absence of identification with Morocco is notable.

The paradoxes of Amazigh identity

One afternoon at a cafe in Nador, Ali and I started discussing the various terms used to describe people in the Rif region in Morocco. What was the right term? Rifian, Berber, Amazigh, or Moroccan? Ali summed the many identities up and said “We are all Moroccan

here, and Rifian. We are also Amazigh.” Amazigh, he explained, is a generic term signifying the indigenous population of North Africa.

In addition to being an emic marker of identity amongst Spanish Muslims, and Rifians in the surrounding region, the term Amazigh is used actively by the government of Melilla and in official politics. Amazigh is a recent generic term, and is used for the same groups that earlier were known as Berbers. The etymology of the term Berber stems from both Arabic and Greek, and has generally been attributed to people who speak an unintelligible language³² (Karell, 2014, p. 15). Whereas the term Berber was imposed on the various pre-Arab people of North Africa, Amazigh is a term that comes from the Amazigh themselves, and translates to “free man” (Karell, 2014, p. 15). The change between being called Berbers to call themselves, and demanding to be called, Amazigh, is not simply a matter of changing name, and there is a considerable ethnonationalist Amazigh movement. The movement is quite recent, and contradicts an earlier statement by Gellner, who stated that “most cultures are led to the dustheap of history by civilization without offering any resistance”, and further argued that both Moroccan Berbers and Highland Scots have incorporated into their now surrounding nation-states (Gellner, 1990 [1983], p. 47). In the 1990s, a new awareness of self-identification emerged amongst people whom had previously been categorized as Berber, and in 1997, the first World Amazigh Congress gathered on the Canary Islands, an island group that also hosts an Amazigh population (Crawford and Hoffman, 2000, p. 118). Amazigh awareness grew throughout the decade, and the internet helped organize previously scattered Amazigh communities throughout North Africa (Crawford and Hoffman, 2000, p. 118). The ethnogenesis of the Amazigh as a recent imagined community was largely organized through the internet, with websites such as Amazigh-net working as a common platform to promote Amazigh awareness³³ (Crawford and Hoffman, 2000, p. 120). The conversion from Berber to Amazigh thus seems to form a re-imagined community, in which a group who earlier were categorized by outsiders have taken the power to define themselves.

This re-imagined community is related to set of commonalities, the most important being descendants of pre-Arab inhabitants of North Africa. Furthermore, all Amazigh are related to the language family Tamazight, consisting of several languages. In many ways, the

32 There are of course connotations to the term barbar, or barbarian, a label often reserved for “uncivilized” people.

33 Today there are many Amazigh awareness groups on the social media site “Facebook”.

Amazigh satisfies the requirements of a nation or ethnic group laid forth by Gellner (1990 [1983]) and Barth (1982 [1969]), as many Amazigh recognize each other as belonging to the same ethnic (and social, or national) group, and share a culture and language (although the internal inconsistency seems to be obscured to exaggerate external difference).

In Melilla, the local variant is Tarifit, which differ from many other Tamazight dialects. It is however important to note that the dialect is usually referred to as Tamazight (or Rifian), rather than the specified Tarifit. Ali believed that the various Tamazight languages would eventually merge. In the Moroccan context, it is reasonable to believe that this is due to a recent change in language politics in Morocco, as Tamazight has been gradually standardized and integrated. In Morocco, Tamazight language, and Amazigh culture, was oppressed for the benefit of Arabic and Arab culture post-independence (Crawford and Hoffman, 2000, p. 123). Recent policy changes, notably under the reign of King Mohammed VI, have started efforts to integrate and acknowledge the Amazigh as part of Morocco's common national heritage. The new policy of tolerant inclusion rather than forced assimilation has also reached the Rif, a region whose King Mohammed VI's father, King Hassan II, had a notoriously bad relation with. In Al-Hoceïma, it was decided to build a museum to celebrate the contributions of Rifian culture in Morocco under the patronage of King Mohammed VI in 2011, but as of 2015, the constructions had not begun³⁴. In addition, a language institute has been established, once again under the patronage of King Mohammed VI, which seeks to standardize the three dialects of Tamazight that exists in Morocco (Errihani, 2006, p. 144). The goal is to implement the language in the Moroccan educational system (Errihani, 2006, p. 143). Here arises the first paradox of Amazigh identity. Harrison describes how the Turkish government has adopted a politics to “appropriate minority cultures as deliberate state policy” (Harrison, 1999, p. 246), the minority in question being the Kurdish. There is an obvious link between Kurds and Amazigh (or Berbers) of Morocco, as they are both (currently or previously repressed) minorities in their respective nation-states. After failing to control Kurdish nationalist movements in the 1990s, the Turkish government adopted a strategy of appropriating, or hijacking, symbols previously used by Kurdish nationalist, by stating that they were in fact

³⁴ The museum is partly funded through the EU regional development fund, which also finances multiple projects in Melilla.

Turkish, rather than Kurdish (Harrison, 1999, pp. 246-247). The case is similar to the Moroccan (and Spanish) positions towards the Amazigh, and is possible through establishing a connection between territory and the nation-state. The recent changes in Moroccan policy that includes Amazigh and Rifian heritage as parts of Moroccan heritage is, as the Amazigh themselves, a result of a re-imagining of the nation. So, what is so paradoxical about including a previously oppressed minority? The answer depends on who gets the authority to define what it means to be Amazigh, which finally brings us back to Melilla.

Within Melilla there is plenty of Amazigh symbolism. Amazigh symbols consists of flags and the Amazigh symbol and merchandise with the Amazigh colors, blue, green, yellow and red. In small stores in both Melilla and Nador, it is possible to buy various souvenirs with the Amazigh flag, such as caps and scarfs. In Melilla, the term Amazigh has been adopted to the benefit of both the terms Rifian and Berber by officials and Spaniards in general. The adoption of the term is in fact naturalized to such a degree that one Spaniard informant thought the term Rifian was condescending, and that one should rather use Amazigh to describe the Spanish Muslims, if one were not to describe them as Spanish Muslims. To further strengthen the multicultural image in Melilla, an “Ethnographic Museum of Amazigh and Sephardi”³⁵ culture was opened in 2011. The museum is located in the old fortress, Melilla la Vieja, and exhibits various artifacts from two of the four cultures in Melilla. In the Sephardi part of the museum, various artifacts related to the practice of Judaism are carefully placed in glass installations, and there is a replica of the inside of the synagogue in Melilla. Continuing into the Amazigh part of the museum, a short terminological explanation is given, stating how Amazigh, like the term Berber, is a generic term. The museum contains artifacts such as tents and everyday equipment used by Berbers (or Amazigh) throughout history, some of which might rather have been placed in the museum of history and architecture next door. A plaque explains how the Amazigh, now called Berbers, used to have an animistic religion, and how “the majority was not Christian”, for some strange reason, before becoming Muslims at the time of Arab conquest of the region. Another plaque explains the whereabouts and life of the Amazigh, now presented as Berbers again.

35 Jews originating from Spain, and the ancestors of those expelled in 1492.

Berber communities are currently situated in the mountains and in the far south, in areas that correspond to where they withdrew after battles fought with successive occupants. Their continued armed resistance throughout history has qualified them as a warrior people.

Before the historical conquests, Berber society was organized in small republics, maybe autonomous, who regrouped in confederations to fight a common enemy: Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines and Arabs. Later, they denied to assimilate and resisted Turks and Europeans, mainly the Spaniards and the French.

(Text from a plaque at the Museo Etnográfico de Amazigh y Sefardí in Melilla.
Translated by author)

The information offered in the text is probably historically correct, as the relationship between various indigenous tribes in the Maghreb and North Africa, and foreign invaders have resulted in battles, and the Amazigh have proven to be notoriously difficult to assimilate into forced communities, imagined or not. What is strange is rather the context, as the museum was established to celebrate the four cultures of Melilla. The framing of the Amazigh population, the Rifians in the context of Melilla, seem unfortunate, and if one is to learn from history, future integration of Rifians as Spanish Muslims in Melilla would seem very difficult. One of Sibai's Spanish Muslim informants does however sum this up, as she states how "integration is a ridiculous term. It is understood as homogenizing and that makes no sense. We are all plural... I think here in Melilla, each community is in its own world." (Sibai, 2010, p. 194). Resistance as a way of life for the Amazigh should be contextualized, and the events of the 1980s in which the Muslims of Melilla fought for recognition as Spanish citizens do not really fit in to the picture of a resisting warrior people. In an interview with local historian Mustafá Akalay Nasser, the local lawyer Nayim Mohamed Ali argues how the fight for integration in the mid-80s was a fight for rights as Spanish citizens (Nasser, 2014, p. 42). He further argues how the concept of integration in Melilla is predominantly seen from a Spaniard point of view, and points to the fact that a grand majority of Spanish Muslims in Melilla speak Spanish and know Spanish culture, as it is also their culture (Nasser, 2014, p. 43). How many Spaniards know a word of Tamazight he then asks? Nasser's book is interesting as ethnographic data, as it is structured around a set of questions and interviews that are answered by different Melillans

who holds reputable positions as journalists, social scientists and lawyers. Some interesting tendencies appear throughout the book, as those with typical Spanish names refer to the Spanish Muslim population as Amazigh, and those with Arabic names (Amazigh in Morocco have long been denied the right to choose Amazigh names), typically refer to themselves as Spanish or Melillan Muslims (Nasser, 2014).

Chapter summary

In this chapter I have seen how Spanish Muslims in Melilla are framed by differently from different groups, and how the way they are framed is influenced from which side of the border they are seen. The majority of Spanish Muslims in Melilla are ethnically Rifians, and thus descendants of the people who earlier posed the external threat to Melilla. The reactions to the law on Aliens in the 1980s surfaced fears amongst Spaniards towards the to-be Muslims, as their incorporation into the city would pose a perceived internal threat. Spanish Muslims as a “Trojan horse” for the Moroccan government does however not take into account the Rifian identity of the Spanish Muslims, and the historical relations between the people of the Rif and the Moroccan government. If we can allow ourselves to turn our informants in to objects for a minute, Spanish Muslims in Melilla are “good to think with” in the intersection of geopolitical borders and social boundaries. The “problem” with Spanish Muslims in Melilla is not that they are illegal citizens, and neither that they are “socially” Moroccans. Rather, they represent an interesting type of frontiersmen, who have found their place betwixt and between geopolitical borders and social boundaries. Here, the frontier is not seen as a synonym to borders nor boundaries, but rather the negotiation between the two, thus creating a new place that stretches and contracts following its own logic. As a frontiersman, this can be dealt with contextually. In the case of religion, the ethnic (or more precisely religious, as both Arabs and Rifians are included) boundary makes the Spanish Muslims more culturally similar with people residing on the other side of the border fences than those across the peninsula. Since 2010, the Muslim celebration Eid el-Kebir has been officially celebrated in Melilla (López-Bueno, 2013, p. 234). And although there is a one hour time difference between Spain and Morocco, daily rhythm for practicing Muslims on both sides of the border are structured around the five daily prayers, and the adhan³⁶ is performed simultaneously on both sides of the border,

36 The Islamic call to worship.

creating a beautiful symphony of sound if one stands close to the border. However, Spanish Muslims also follow the daily siesta in Melilla, and speak Spanish in everyday life. The synthesis of the multiple identities and group memberships of the Spanish Muslims in Melilla seems to have created a particular sense of feeling Melillense, as a both hybrid but at the same time increasingly firm identity. As the leader of the CpM stated, “Somos Melillense.”

Lastly in this chapter, I have discussed the paradoxes of Amazigh. Amazigh identity is a fairly recent phenomena, as the people earlier known as Berbers have taken the right to define themselves rather than being defined by others. They have found their way out of what Gellner called “the dustheap of history” (1990 [1983], p. 47). Categorizing the Spanish Muslims of Melilla as Amazigh is done both by Spanish Muslims themselves and by the Spaniards, as the Amazigh has been incorporated into official city discourse. The identity as Amazigh is like being Melillense an alternative to conforming to set categories of being either Moroccan or Spanish. Identifying as Moroccan does not ever seem to be an option, and this identity is primarily ascribed to the Spanish Muslims by either Spaniards or Moroccans. Spaniards identifications of Spanish Muslims as Amazigh also entail a way to postpone acknowledging them as proper Spanish.

Conclusions

As Malinowski noted almost a hundred years ago, the “sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic position” of anthropology is that as soon as the fieldworker has left the field, “the material of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity” (Malinowski, 1961 [1922], p. xv). As the field might have changed, it is difficult to say that I have reached a conclusion, and it would maybe be more appropriate to call this section final remarks. Before I left Málaga in January 2015, I visited the museum of a local painter, Pablo Picasso. Through my audio guide, a narrator told me a quote by Picasso. Picasso despised saying that he ever finished a painting, or a work. “To finish it means to be through with it, to kill it, to rid it of its soul – to give it its final blow!”³⁷. However, the purpose of a dissertation is to hand it in, and I will try to arrange the pieces presented into a larger picture.

Melilla was conquered in the extension of the reconquista of the Iberian Peninsula. The essence of the reconquista is the Spanish perception of having been conquered under the period of Al Andalus. I have argued, following others, that Spanish national identity today has been constructed with the “moor” as the Other. Originally, the conquest of Melilla was done to prevent future attacks and invasions of the Iberian Peninsula, but by analyzing history, it becomes apparent that the conflicts the city has been involved in through the years has been more about defending itself, than defending the Spanish mainland. It would be difficult to argue against the fact that most of the issues in Melilla are directly related to it being a Spanish, and hence foreign, city on what was first Rifian territory, and now a part of a sovereign Moroccan nation-state. Those who died defending Melilla were nevertheless Spanish, and as it goes, the greatest sacrifice one can give the nation is one's life. For years, Melilla was a military outpost, before being turned into a city in the late 19th century. From the early 20th century, Muslims from the surrounding regions moved into the city. One of these was the Khattabi's, and as I am wrapping up this thesis, I find it relevant to present a short historical account, that might tell us something about the future.

Throughout this dissertation, I have mentioned Abd el-Krim Khattabi briefly on various occasions. Abd el-Krim is perhaps one of the most important figures who is not mentioned in Melilla, and is in fact the reason that the statue of Francisco Franco is still standing at the

³⁷ This is of course a paraphrasing, but includes the essential message of the quote.

port³⁸. Abd el-Krim was born in Ajdir, Morocco, and moved to Melilla with his family in early 1900s. In Melilla he worked as both a Muslim judge (qadi) and a journalist in the newspaper “El Telegrama del Rif³⁹” (Maddy-Weitzman, 2012, p. 143; Er, 2015, p. 3). Towards the 1920s, Abd el-Krim grew suspicious towards the Spanish, as they started expanding into the Rif region. He was jailed after a conflict with Spanish authorities in 1915, and after his release, he left Melilla and was elected as the military leader of Rifian tribes in 1921 (Er, 2015, p. 4). In June 1921, Abd el-Krim and his army attacked Spanish forces who in Morocco, and at the Battle of Annual⁴⁰, some 10,000 out of a total 25,000 Spanish soldiers died, facing a Rifian force of 3000 armed rebels (Er, 2015, p. 5). The war lasted until 1926, during which Abd el-Krim and the Rifians established the Rif Republic (Er, 2015, p. 5). Abd el-Krim was eventually defeated, and went into exile in Egypt.

The story of Abd el-Krim is interesting, but I will limit my details to the extent described above. Abd el-Krim summarizes many of the topics described in this thesis. First, borders are dynamic, and despite the effort put into presenting borders as old and self-evident, they are the result of (often quite recent) history. Despite living an apparently comfortable life in Melilla, Abd el-Krim reacted to the Spanish expansion into Rifian territory. Territory and identity, I have attempted to show, are inextricably linked. Living and working in Melilla, already then a Spanish city for some 400 years, was unproblematic. When the Spanish started their expansion, it was however met with violent means. At the time, Muslims in Melilla were not included as political bios to a full extent, but neither was Abd el-Krim, the Khattabi's, and other “moros amigos” political zoe. It would not be hard to imagine that Abd el-Krim's exit from Melilla to gather a force to rise against the Spanish “invaders” would have be seen as a betrayal. In chapter 5, I discussed how the naturalization of Spanish Muslims in the mid-1980s was met with great suspicion from the Spaniards in the city, as many considered the Spanish Muslims to be a “Trojan horse for the Moroccan state”. And although not mentioned, it is probable to assume that the army led by Abd el-Krim is one of those mentioned in the ethnographic museum as Berber tribes who resisted and refused to assimilate. Abd el-Krim's Rifian army reached Melilla, but did not attack

38 Abd el-Krim is however remembered in Nador, where a school is named Abdelkrim El Khattabi Secondary School.

39 “El Telegrama del Rif” was renamed “El Telegrama” in the 60s, after Moroccan independence, and was where the journalist Constantino Domínguez Sánchez, whom I have used extensively in this thesis, worked. The newspaper went bankrupt during my fieldwork.

40 Known as the Disaster of Annual in Spain, where the battle is also seen as an event that led to the dictatorship (1923-1930) of Miguel Primo de Rivera.

because they feared international repercussions (Woolman, 1968, p. 95).

The case in question is a bit complicated, but comprehensible. During the time of the protectorate, Spain had judicial claims on the territory in which the battles were fought, but those who resided within the territory, the Rifians, did not acknowledge this presence. The territory was not controlled by the Spanish state, and in Weberian terms, they did not have the monopoly of using violence. Border negotiations during the Rif War was done by sword, but fluctuating borders have also appeared in my thesis, although in a different manner. The reluctance to acknowledge Spanish presence on Moroccan soil has been transferred from the Rif Republic, self-acclaimed as independent from both the Spanish and the Moroccan state (which did not exist at the time), to the recent Moroccan claims on the Spanish enclaves under the argument that they are situated on what is seen as Moroccan sovereign territory. This claim is countered by both Spaniards in Melilla, and Spanish Muslims (and partly also by Rifians). As of today, Melilla holds its position as Spanish, even though the definition of what that means is changing. In chapter 4 I argued that Spaniards in Melilla have turned their gaze across the Alboran Sea, towards the Iberian Peninsula. Moroccan independence stopped Spanish claims over the Moroccan hinterlands, as this would now be a declaration of war. It has become evident that the role of the Spanish military in Melilla is diminished, although there are still a number of soldiers and military presence in Melilla. It is no longer armed conflict that is the threat to Melilla, and I have argued that the new threat is cultural permeability and migration, i.e. civilian rather than military.

It is difficult to make predictions, but I will try to make some anyways. Based on available published estimates, and estimates made by people in Melilla, it seems as if the Spaniards in Melilla are already a minority in the city. It is however still Spanish, and from what I observed amongst young Spanish Muslims and Spaniards in Melilla, their identity as citizens of both Spain, and as Melillans, will move the city towards its self-predicted goal as a multicultural city. In the current situation, the city remains largely segregated, but as Tariq stated, it all depends on what the young people do. The only potential situation in which I can imagine Spain will give up their Spanish territories in Morocco would be if they considered the economic costs of maintaining the cities to be higher than the benefit of keeping them. This does however also seem implausible, as the last hundred years have

created a strong connection between territory and the Spanish nation in Melilla. Most citizens in Melilla seem to have conformed to their identities as Melillans. National identity in Melilla follows similar patterns as that in the Pyrenees, described earlier in this thesis. Here, Lamont and Mólnar argued that the new border was not only a divide imposed from above, but that the locals also made use of these new separations “in pursuit of local interests” (2002, p. 183). For now, the maintenance of Melilla as a Spanish city in Morocco seems to fulfill the local interests of many of its Spanish Muslims citizens. Furthermore, as the city has become embedded into the Spanish imagined community, the Spaniards of Melilla has also made a connection between the territory in which they reside.

Future studies

Melilla is in a transition that is going to define its future character. Will the Spaniards of Melilla leave when the Spanish Muslims become a majority? Much suggests that the Spanish Muslims in Melilla already are the numerical majority of the city, but political power is still held by the Christian Partido Popular. What would happen if the Muslim Coalición por Melilla wins the next election? For now, the religious aspect of local politics in Melilla is at best poorly understated. However, the existence of a Muslim/Rifian dominated party in Melilla does not necessarily mean all Muslims/Rifians in Melilla are going to vote for that party (ethnic composition was for example not reflected in the 2015 election results). I suspect this has to do with a new composite identity, as many in Melilla subscribe to an identity of being Melillens. It has become clear that national identity is important in Melilla, and being Spanish is as important as not being Moroccan for the Spanish Muslims I have met (being a Spanish Muslim was as much a kind of being Spanish as being Catalan or Basque, Tariq stated). It is however somewhat complex, and what I suspect is needed is further studies of a type of transnationalism that does not presuppose that this only includes people who bring their “domestic culture” into a new place, but rather carefully explore what happens in the border – social boundary nexus. Spanish Muslims adoption and adaptation of the category Melillense seem to have created a category which works outside the binary logic of neighboring nation-states, and a further study of such non-binary identity (i.e. identity that stems from a category outside and between the dominant, such as Spanish and Moroccan) would be fruitful, not at least to understand the future demographic developments in Melilla, and what this is going to entail.

In the extension of this, it could be interesting to do a comparative study in Ceuta. Like Melilla, Ceuta is a Spanish enclave in North Africa. There are however two important differences. First, it is located close to the Iberian Peninsula, and secondly, the majority of Spanish Muslims in Ceuta are Arab, rather than Rifian (Amazigh).

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